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Bilateral investment treaties have today become an integral part
of international relations and their existence undoubtedly has a great
impact in influencing the formulation of international public policy.'
Though most of these treaties have been made between developed
and developing countries, some have been concluded among the de-
veloping countries themselves.2
A large number of commentators on bilateral investment treaties,
or BITs, view them as vehicles that entrench customary principles of
international law relating to the protection of foreign investment. The
* SJ.D. Candidate, The George Washington University National Law Center, LL.M. in In-
ternational Law, The George Washington University National Law Center, 1993; LL.M. in Com-
parative Law, University of Brussels, 1992; LL.B.(hons.), University of Nairobi, 1990, Advocate
of the High Court of Kenya. The author wishes to thank Professor Louis B. Sohn and Professor
Ralph G. Steinhardt for reviewing earlier drafts of this Article. Any remaining errors are, of
course, solely my own responsibility.
1 See ICSID, Investment and Protection Treaties (1983); Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natu-
ral Resources in International Law, 162 RECUEIL DES CouRs 255 (1979); Aron Broches, Bilateral
Investment Protection Treaties and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF ARBrrRA-
TION, Liber Aricorum Pieter Sanders (J. Shulliz & AJ. Van den Berg 1982); Asken, The Case
for Bilateral Treaties, in PRrVATE INvEsTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUnONS, 357,358 (M.
Landewhr ed., 1981); Akinsanya Adeoye, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investment
in the Third World, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 58 (1987); Peter Paul, Investment Risk and Trust: The
Role of International Law, in INT'L L. & DEy. 131-62 (De Waart et al. eds., 1988); Krai Chitti,
International Treaties, Investment and Thailand, THJL. Y.B. INT'L & CoMP. L. 76-83 (1986);
Leich M. Nash, International Economic Law: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 948
(1986).
2 See, eg., Agreement: Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 9, 1980, Sing.-Sri
lanka, 1980, S.I.T.L. 32.
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late F.A. Mann contended vigorously that "these treaties establish and
accept and thus enlarge the force of traditional conceptions of the law
of state responsibility for foreign investment." He noted in the first
place the very large number of treaties, the scope of which is increased
by the operation of the most favoured nation clause. Secondly, he
noted the fact that many States which have purported to reject the
traditional conceptions and standards included in these treaties have
accepted them, when it came to the crunch.3 In an analysis delivered
with his usual cogency, Dr Mann poses this question:
Is it possible for a State to reject the rule according to which alien prop-
erty may be expropriated only on certain terms long believed to be re-
quired by customary international law, yet to accept it for the purpose of
these treaties?
Mann believed that the paramount duty of States, as imposed by in-
ternational law, is to observe the tenets of good faith and to act ac-
cordingly. Thus, where bilateral investment treaties "express a duty
which customary law imposes or is widely believed to impose, they
give very strong support to the existence of such a duty and preclude
the contracting States from denying its existence." 4
A former legal advisor to the U.S Department of State relied
heavily on bilateral investment agreements (hereinafter BITs) to ar-
gue that the Hull formula of "prompt, adequate and effective" com-
pensation continues to be accepted. He observed that
[s]tates have shown their real practice by establishing a network of inter-
national treaties. Provisions controlling compensation are contained in
Bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties. In the
case of the United States, many of these are with developing countries as
well as with developed nations. They contain provisions calling for com-
pensation in terms equivalent to the traditional standard, although there
are slight drafting variations. The history of these agreements indicates
that the parties recognized that they were thereby making the customary
3 F.A. Mann, British Treaties For the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 52 Brr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 241, 249 (1981). He suggested that the ICJ decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Case, ICJ RmrS 4 (1969), to the effect that rules of international law cannot easily be deduced
from bilateral treaties does not apply to the BITs because there existed a very large number of
such treaties. Interestingly, Mann has elsewhere refuted this argument. Referring to taxation
treaties, he has observed that:
"... although the international law of fiscal jurisdiction enjoys the unique and outstanding
distinction of being regulated by a network of treaties, it is open to doubt whether they are
expressive of, or exceptions to the rules of customary international law.
F.A. MANN, SrUDIEs IN INMRNATIONAL LAw 95 (1973).
4 Mann, British Treaties, supra note 3, at 249-51.
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rule of international law explicit in the treaty language and reaffirming
its effect 5
In this paper, I propose to investigate the utility of BITs in the
formulation of customary international law in the area of state respon-
sibility for the protection of alien property. It is my thesis that the
frenetic conclusion of BITs is occasioned by the uncertainty that per-
vades international investment law since the advent of the developing
countries on the international scene, and secondly, that international
law has not kept pace with the developments that have taken place in
the last thirty years in foreign direct investment. To the extend that
this is so, I contend that each BIT is nothing but a lex specialis be-
tween parties designed to create a mutual regime of investment pro-
tection. In my view, such lex specialis is necessary simply because of
the uncertainty in the law on investment protection but such uncer-
tainty I humbly submit cannot be removed on a universal basis by
these treaties as they do not consistently support defimite legal princi-
ples. On the other hand, it is my contention that the proliferation of
BITs will help to confirm the present and indicate the possible future
trends in international foreign investment law.
II. THE GENESIS OF BILATERAL INvESTMENT TREATIES
Modern international economic relations regulated through bilat-
eral or multilateral conventions were preceded by what then came to
be known as gunboat diplomacy. In the pre-1914 era, Latin American
countries protested violently against debt collection by European na-
val forces and marines. The joint naval intervention by Germany,
Great Britain and Italy in Venezuela in 1902 had all the features of
gun boat diplomacy.6 These and other European interventions
sparked off characteristic exercises in ad hoc international law to suit
debtors in default and gave birth to the Drago Doctrine and the Calvo
Clause.7 In the Porter Convention of 1907, a sensible compromise was
5 Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176,177
(1984). For the view that property protection clauses in the FCN treaties were valueless, see
ROBERT R. WILSON, THm INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES (1953). For the view that practice in the FCN Treaties on Compensation was not uni-
form, see STANLEY D. METZEGER, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 127 (1966).
6 EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 147 (1951); see The
Venezuela Preferential (Germany et aL v. Venez. et aL), 1916 HAGUE CT REs. (Scott) 55 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. Feb. 22, 1904).
7 See Luis M. DRAGO, LA REUBaICA ARGENTINA Y EL CASO DE VENEZUELA (1903);
Drago, State Loans in their Relation to International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 692 (1907). See also
MARTENS, PAR LA JUSTICE VER LA PAIX (1904). The Calvo Doctrine has its source in a
number of statements made by the Argentine diplomat and international law writer Carlos
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reached on the subject of forcible debt collection. In principle, will-
ingness to submit to the peaceful settlement of investment disputes
and to carry out awards was accepted as a substitute for unilateral and
forcible debt collection by the home state of the creditors concerned.8
Throughout the modem era, especially in the 19th and 20th cen-
tury, the rules of international law governing international commerce
and foreign investment were reaffirmed with minor reformulations
through bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
(FCN) between capital exporting countries and between them and
capital importing countries.9 Further attempts to underpin the gov-
erning rules of international law by basing them on equivalent general
principles of law recognized by "civilized" nations and alleged rules of
natural law carried matters a little further.10 Yet they were sympto-
matic of a growing uneasiness in western countries about the willing-
ness of the new states to comply with existing international law." The
Calvo (1824-1906). M. CARLOS CALVO, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
(Paris, 5th ed., 1896). See also CALVO, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRvI-
Para 104,134-37 (1884). The Calvo Clause binds foreign investors to waive appeal to diplomatic
protection, and permits them to seek redress only in the local courts and under the law of the
host state. The principles emanating from the Calvo Clause were embodied in the constitutions
and statutes of Latin American countries and in treaties concluded among them. For examples
of constitutional provisions, see BoLt CoNsT. art. 24; HOND. CONsT. art. 33; VENEZ. CONST. art.
127. For texts of these, see CONSITuTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1-20 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1971). See also FRANK G. DAwsON & IVAN L. HEAD, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 113-22 (1974). Such princi-
ples have been restated in inter-American instruments such as the famous Decision 24 issued by
the Andean Pact Commission in 1970. ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE, Dec. 31,1970, 11
I.L.M. 126 (effective June 20, 1971). Article 51 of the decision provides that:
[I]n no instrument relating to investments or the transfer of technology shall there be
clauses that remove possible conflicts or controversies from the national jurisdiction and
competence of the recipient country or allow the subrogation by States to the rights and
actions of their national investors.
Ik- at 141. See also Abelardo L. Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1972); Opinion of the inter-American Juridical Committee on Transna-
tional Enterprises, Dated February 13, 1976, Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. 147 OEAISer.Q/iv.12
(May 1976).
8 Hague Convention II of 1907 (on the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts), in J.B. Sco-r, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS
OF 1899 AND 1907 89 (1915).
9 ROBERT R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
116-25 (1960). See also Martin Domke, American Protection Against Foreign Expropriation in
the Light of the Suez Canal Crisis, 105 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1033 (1957); Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties
for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign InvestmenL Present United States Practice, 5
AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); Roy PREIswERK, LA PROTECTION DES INVESrSSEMEN'rs PRvI5S
DANS LES TRArrEs BILATERAUX 100-04 (1963).
10 WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRucrTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1964).
11 See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Communist Theories on Confiscation and Expropriation.
Critical Comments, 7 AM. J. COmp. L. 541, 543-48 (1958); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the
Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INT'L & COmp. L.Q.
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1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on the protection of foreign
direct investment was stillborn as it sought to re-assert the traditional
norms of international law.12 This was followed by the OECD Draft
Convention which the OECD membership refused to adopt.13 The
traditional norms of international law came under increasing attack
from the developing countries. These traditional norms were based
on a system of investment protection which relied on the existence of
an international minimum standard of protection for foreign invest-
ment, the diplomatic protection by the home state in situations where
such standards were not accorded the foreign investor. Responsibility
was imposed upon the host state for failure to accord that standard of
treatment. 14 The alternative model long espoused by the Latin Amer-
ican countries and later adopted by the developing countries is that
foreign investment is subject to national control and that disputes aris-
ing from it must be settled by domestic courts in accordance with do-
mestic law.'5 It is important to note that neither the Calvo Doctrine
121, 128, 130-31 (1965); R.P. Anand, Attitude of Certain Asian-African States Towards Certain
Problems of International Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55,63 (1966); MEIZGER, LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE 105 (1966); Rudolf Bystricky, On the Principle of Obligatory Co-operation of
States, in LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG
STATES 99, 109-10 (M.K. Nawaz et al. eds., 1966).
12 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, April 1959, 9 J.P.L. 116 (1960).
13 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, 7 I.L.M.
117 (1962). The bilateral investment agreements became popular after the failure of interna-
tional efforts to secure a multilateral agreement. These efforts are described in GEORGE
SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-20 (1969).
14 For the customary law of investment protection, see generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1919). For the emergence of alternative views,
see C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967). For the asser-
tion of the traditional values, see Richard B. Lillich, Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of
Aliens, 161 RECUEIL DES Cours 329 (1978). For the views propounded by the developing coun-
tries, see generally Bums H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and
the Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981); Charles N. Brower &
John B. Tepe, The Charter Of Economic Rights And Duties Of States: A Reflection or Rejection
of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295; Robin C.A. White, A New International Economic
Order, 24 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 542 (1975); STEPHEN NEFF, FRIENDS BUT NO ALLIES: ECONOMIC
LIBERALISM AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990); Rozental, The Charter Of Economic Rights and
Duties of States and the New International Economic Order, VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 318-19 (1976);
Eduardo Jimenez De Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 302 (1978); Richard Falk, The New States And International Legal Order, 118
RECUEIL DES CouRs 1, 29 (1966); JERZY MENKES, THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
DER: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OUrLINE (1988). See also THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER ( Edwin P. Reubens Ed. 1981); THOMAS M. FRANCK & MARK M.
MUNANSANGU, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
MAKING? 5 (1982).
15 CALVO, supra note 7, at 692. The Calvo Clause, which was the linchpin of Latin American
policy to foreign investment, is binding on a foreign investor who accepts it (but see infra note
200 for the change in attitude towards foreign direct investment in the Latin American coun-
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in its general application, nor any specific Calvo Clause, has inhibited
states outside the Latin American region from the espousal of the
claims of their nationals against other states, when they deemed such
action necessary or appropriate.
The position championed by the developing countries reached its
apogee in the promulgation of the 1974 U.N Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.' 6 The bone of contention in this charter
was Article 2(2)(c) which provides that
[each state has the right t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer owner-
ship of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should
be paid by the state adopting such measures, taking into account its rele-
vant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the state considers
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to
a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the national-
izing state and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by
all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of
the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of
free choice of means. 17
The apparent dichotomy in the norms that govern foreign investment
militates against a conclusion that there exists an international consen-
sus on what amounts to customary international law on foreign invest-
ments. A realistic assessment of the present situation of the law is
that if a coherent body of customary principles on investment protec-
tion did exist, the emergence of contrary norms at the international
level supported by the developing countries has considerably eroded
the utility and juridical vitality of that body of law.' 8
It is this uncertainty relating to the law on state responsibility that
has given an impetus to the negotiation of bilateral investment trea-
ties. The argument that these treaties strengthen the now antiquated
"customary law" on investment protection cannot be supported in the
tries). This position was stated in North Am. Dredging Co. of Texas (U.S.A) v. United Mexican
States, 4 R.I.A.A. 26 (March 31, 1926). Commenting on the investors waiver of diplomatic pro-
tection, the commission held that the investor could not by so doing deprive the government of
his nation of its undoubted right of applying international remedies to violations of international
law committed to his damage. Id. at 29. See IA BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 546 (3rd ed. 1979); L. OPPENHEiM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 345 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
1955). MAX SORENS.N, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 592 (1968).
16 G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The Resolution was adopted by a large majority of 120 States, but the U.S. and five West Euro-
pean nations voted against it. Ten other states, including Japan and Canada abstained.
17 Id. at 52.
18 Views have even been expressed that the norms supported by the developing countries
have displaced the traditional principles of foreign investment protection. See, e.g., White, supra
note 14, at 547. Many others have taken the view that the resolutions are not binding but are
only hortatory. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 14, at 302.
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context in which such treaty making has taken place which usually
involves the exchange of quid pro quo between the contracting par-
ties. Each treaty is bound to be different from the other as each de-
pends on the internal political order and the economic aspirations of
each developing country. A country may concede far reaching rights
to another on account of the quids it receives in return for such con-
cessions. Each treaty then stands on its feet as formulating a particu-
lar legal order shared by only two countries and it reflects a
compromise of the particular interests of the parties. As such, they do
not give rise to any international consensus capable of creating a
structure for the protection of foreign investment. Without prejudice
to the foregoing, it is important to note that the BITs contain views
and practice of states and for that reason they should engage the con-
cern of the international lawyer on account of the incremental contri-
bution they make, if any, to the formulation of an international
consensus on the murky subject of state responsibility to foreign
investors.
III. BILATERAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
A. Philosophical Underpinnings
The term "treaty" is used here in its two connotations viz. as an
agreement (ad negotium) i.e. as an act of consent and as a document
i.e. as an instrument of proof (ad instrumentum). The earliest distinc-
tion between different categories of agreements-an ordinary con-
tract (Vertrag) and a lawmaking agreement (Vereinbarung)-was
made by Professor Binding, the distinguished German jurist. He de-
fined the Vereinbarung as the fusion of different wills which have the
same content in which every party declares the intent and aims at the
realization of an end that is of interest to all.' 9 Using different termi-
nology, Professor Bergobhm applied this distinction to international
agreements. He distinguished between treaties made to realize a par-
ticular juridical operation establishing or abrogating rights of signato-
ries, where the intent of founding a rule of international law, is lacking
and treaties composed of abstract legal rules which the parties explic-
itly agree to recognize as common "norms" for their future conduct.2'
Applying Binding's terminology to Bergbohm's concept, Trieppel
tried to establish a theory to explain why some treaties are Vertragen
19 BINDING, Dm GRUNDING DES NORDDENTSCHEN BUNDES [THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
NORTH GERMAN FEDERATION] 69, 70 (1869).
20 BERGBOHM, STAATSVERTRAGE UND GESErZE ALS QUELLEN DES VOLKERRFCrS [TREA-
TIES AND AcTS AS SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 77 (1877).
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while others were Vereinbarungen. To him this was the key to solving
the serious problem of the origin or fondement of international law.
In his view, the only conceivable basis for international law is a will
superior to the common will of each state. This in his view could only
be the common will of States (Gemeinwille) as a unified will (Willen-
seinheit) created by a union of the individual wills of all states party to
an agreement (willenseigmung). Accordingly, he adopted the distinc-
tion between agreements designed to satisfy different and opposing
ends which thus could not create a common will and agreements
which are in fact a realization of the identical aims of parties, con-
cluded by the "common will" and as a result capable of making rules
of law. The first are Vertragen; the second, Vereinbarungen.21 Nothing
in this distinction necessarily entails the consequence that the Vertrag
be bilateral and the Vereinbarung multilateral.' The Vereinbarung
must, in Triepel's view, be open to accession by all States, since it can
bind other States only by their accession.3
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the earliest distinction
between "law-making" and other treaties was based mainly on
whether the parties to a treaty wanted the same or different things. It
was an attempt to classify treaties according to two principles of or-
ganization: organization by common aims and organization by reci-
procity.24 This distinction was very early on heavily contested and its
credibility doubted. Professor Gihl contended that even in the case of
contract, the parties want one and the same thing, namely the under-
taking of the whole agreement which comprises the content of the
contract.25 On the other hand, reciprocity is a characteristic feature of
all treaties, including those claimed to be law-making.26
21 HEINRICH TRIEPEL, DRorr INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT INTERNE [INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND MUNICIPAL LAW] 68-69 (1920).
22 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Treaty as a Law-Declaring and Custom Making Instrument,
22 REvuE EGYPTIENNE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 51 (1966). But Prof Triepel contends that:
"[L]e <<Contract>> ... ne tolere que deux parties et... la Vereinbarung au contraire est,
par nature <<pluralistique>>." Id. at 83.
23 Professor Shihata contends that this fact reiterates the point that the law-making process
to be carried by the Vereinbarung is not a legislation of general rules for all subjects of interna-
tional law and consequently, is not "law-making" in any proper sense. Rather, it is nothing more
than the laying down of rules for the future conduct of parties. Shihata, supra note 22, at 82-83.
24 See a clear distinction between the two as the basic form of social order in FULLER, FoRMs
AND LIMrrS OF ADUDICATION 4 (1962).
25 TORsTEN GIHL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 50 (1957). See also Werner Levi, Law-
Making Treaties, 28 MINN. L. REv. 247, 250-56 (1944).
26 See also D.H.N. Johnson, The Conclusion of International Conferences, 35 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1,10 (1959). Professor Shihata contends that "[w]hile States may join with each other in
setting down rules to govern their future relationship, this by no means excludes a covert reci-
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Professor Oppenheim, who introduced Binding and Triepel's di-
chotomous principle of organization into English legal literature,
found fault with the basic underpinnings of the doctrine. In his view, a
multilateral (universal) treaty is "concluded for the purpose of laying
down general rules of conduct among a considerable number of
States."27 He contends that all treaties are law-making in as much as
they lay down rules of conduct which the parties are bound to observe
as law.28
B. The Formation Of International Custom
The essential function of a treaty is to represent the consent of its
parties,29 but it may be used as well to demonstrate the existence of a
rule of customary law. Use of the treaty to show that it contributes to
the formation of a customary rule or to prove that such a rule was in
existence before the conclusion of the treaty is one technique a court
may use to determine the content of custom. 30  The acceptance by
States of a certain practice whether by treaty or by any other form of
consent is alleged by most publicists to be the basis of international
custom.31 The phrasing of Article 38(b) of the ICJ Statute lends
procity which may, and usually does, show itself in the course of negotiations. Shihata, supra.
note 22, at 56.
27 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 878-79 (H.Lauterpacht ed., 1955). See also Hersch
Lauterpacht, Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix, 62 RECUEIL DES Cours 94, 156 (1937); Ar-
nold D. McNair, The Functions and Different Legal Characters of Treaties, 11 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
100, 112 (1930).
28 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 878. He also declares that:
[T]he term 'law-making' does not imply that there exists among States international legisla-
tion in the accepted meaning of the term, namely the enactment of laws overriding the will
of the dissenting minority. In the light of Oppenheim's analysis, it appears that the distinc-
tion that was attempted by the progenitors of this legal theory becomes superfluous. How-
ever, it is important to note that whether a treaty is law-making or not is ultimately very
important; especially the number of parties to a treaty is important in practice. This was
brought out succinctly in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations Case, 1949 I.CJ. Rep. 171, 185.
29 See P.E. Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 20,25 (1925).
30 Anthony D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV.
INT'L BULL. 1, 32 (1962). See also The Wimbledon Case, 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25-28
(Aug. 17); Mavromatis Case, 1924 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 2, at 35 (Aug. 30); Nottebohm Case
(Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. Rep. 4, at 22-23 (Apr. 6). For a contrary opinion on the holding in
the Nottebohm Case, see Josef Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase), 54 AM. J. INT'L
L. 536, 557 (1960).
31 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (1952); Lazare Kopelmanas, Cus-
tom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L. 127, 136 (1937);
GIHL, supra note 25, at 73; I.C. McGibbon, Customary International Law, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
123-28 (1957).
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credence to this proposition as it states that the court will apply "inter-
national custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.32
Legal scholars from a considerable antiquity have wrestled with
the issue regarding the basis of the binding force of customary law.
The "common tacit consent" theory advanced since the days of Gro-
tius has come under increasing criticism. Professor Gihl, for example,
finds the origin of customary legal rules in "individual actions under-
taken by the legal person and spontaneously repeated by other legal
persons, until their repetition becomes so constant that they will also
in similar circumstances be repeated in the future.33 Adopting Gihl's
view that it is juridical consciousness (la conscience juridique) that
transforms usage into custom, Professor Politis asserts that
".... the rule of law is binding for all nations belonging to the social
prelieu in which arose juridical consciousness from which it sprang, even
though it is extremely manifested in the relations of some of them
only. ,134
Another test was suggested by Professor Kopelmanas, who wrote that
the "formation and existence of a custom depends on its conformity
with the social needs of a legal order. The custom results from acts of
the same character because those who do them cannot do otherwise."
From this he concluded that "whenever facts themselves impose a cer-
tain conduct on subjects of law, we have a customary rule.35 This test
of "social necessity" was criticized by Sorenson who stated that reci-
procity is an element in both "social necessity" and in considerations
behind international comity-that "cette notion parait mal appropriee a
servir de critere entre la coutume juridique et les actes de courtoisie et
de simples usages sans caractere obligatoire."36 For the customary law
to be valid, there must be opinio juris, i.e. the conviction of States that
32 ICJ STATUTE, ART. 38(B); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the ICJ, (1951-
54): General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 67-68 (1953); Charles De
Visscher, La Codification du Droit International, 6 RECUEIL DES CouRs 325 (1929).
33 GnuL, supra note 25, at 25.
34 NICOLA POLms, THE NEW AsPEcts OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1928). Professor
Shihata has disputed this analysis as too grandiose and not in accord with international legal
reality. He contends that:
This explanation seems to exceed the actual stage of development of international law. It
assumes a sense of community so developed that it can be expressed by the acts of some
members representing the "juridical conscience" of the whole community. Since this devel-
oped sense of community is lacking, the validity of the analysis based upon it is at best
doubtful.
Shihata, supra note 22, at 71.
35 Kopelmanas, supra note 31, at 148. See also FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURIsPRU-
DENCE AND ETHICS 54 (London, Macmillan 1882).
36 M{AX S¢ooRENsoN, LES SOURCES DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 107 (1946).
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the practice has become legally binding.37 Shihata contends that con-
sent plays its role when custom is in the stage of formation, not after it
is already made. When a rule, formulated by an impressive number of
acts of consent emerges as a customary rule, he argues that it becomes
as such, a rule of law applicable to all, regardless of whether a state
accepts or rejects it thereafter. In his view, opinio juris cannot be re-
duced to consent since such reduction involves the equation of cus-
tomary rules with conventional rules. If consent is all that is required,
custom, he states, will be another name for unwritten treaties.38 Cus-
tomary laws develop and wither according to a system different from
that of treaties. While both depend in their formation on the wilful
acts of states, the former emerge as general rules of law, binding not
because they are "consented to" but because they are felt "obliga-
tory."'39 He further contends that:
While it is true that a State may acquire a right (in a territory or other-
wise) by the mere consent of other States concerned, a general custom-
ary rule needs more than such consent. There should be signs that even
States not participants in making the rule have come to observe it as part
of the general law and have acted on this understanding. If consent is
sufficient in the first case to validate the asserted right against States
which accept it, it is also required-but not sufficient-in the other, where
the principle should be accepted by all States concerned as a legal princi-
ple. This "legality" will be conferred only when there is a general con-
viction that States must respect the rights based on the customary
principle as a matter of legal obligation, i.e. when the repetition of State
practice is perfected by an opinio juris.4
The existence of such a conviction, a necessary requirement for the
formation of custom, could be demonstrated by various means. Some
publicists have contended that it is a question of inference based on
overt acts supposed to be evidence of a certain mental state.41 In this
respect, treaties as an explicit expression of the will of States, play a
fundamental evidential role. Professor Hall, in his treatise on interna-
tional law, argues inter-alia that treaties differ from other evidences of
national opinion in that their true character can generally be better
appreciated. He asserts that:
37 Kopelmanas, supra note 31, at 151. In the S.S Lotus, 1928 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No.10, at 28 et
seq., the ICJ found Opinio juris lacking and concluded that the alleged customary rule did not
exist.
38 Shihata, supra note 22, at 72.
39 Shihata, supra note 22, at 72-73. See also I. SMiTH, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS 13 (1932).
40 Shihata, supra note 22, at 73.
41 RONALD F. ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVEIMONS AND THIRD STATES 57 (1917).
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.they are strong, concrete facts, easily seized and easily understood.
They are therefore, of the greatest use as marking points in the move-
ment of thought. If treaties modifying an existing practice, or creating a
new one, are found to grow in number, and to be made between States
placed in circumstances of sufficient diversity; if they are found to be-
come nearly universal for a while, and then to dwindle away, leaving a
practice more or less confirmed, then it is known that a battle has taken
place between new and old ideas, that the former called in the aid of
special contracts till their victory was established, and that when they no
longer needed external assistance, they no longer cared to express them-
selves in the form of so-called conventional law. While, therefore, trea-
ties are usually allied with a charge of law, they have no power to turn
controverted into authoritative doctrines, and they have but little in-
dependent effect in hastening the moment at which the alteration is ac-
complished. Treaties are permanently obeyed when they represent the
continued wishes of the contracting parties.
42
C. World Court, State Practice and International Customary Law
The practice of the World court in determining the utility of bilat-
eral agreements in the formulation of customary international has
been far from consistent. In the Nottebohm Case,4 3 the ICJ found that
State practice as reflected in the Bancroft Treaties," as well as in two
multilateral treaties, bore out the necessity of a "genuine link" be-
tween a State and its national if an international claim was to be
presented on behalf of that individual.45 In the S.S Wimbledon Case,46
the PCIJ was faced with the task of reconciling the provisions of two
bilateral treaties establishing international regimes with the provisions
of a multilateral treaty. The court first found a similarity between the
provisions of the treaties relating to the Panama and Suez Canal
which established the freedom of passage through these international
waterways. On the basis of its finding here, it proceeded to use its
finding to construe the analogous provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. The court, however, did not declare that the common rule run-
ning through the various treaties formed customary international law
42 WILLIAM F. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 11-12 (8th ed. 1924).
43 Nottebohm Case (Liech. V. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. Rep. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 6).
44 E.g., Naturalization Convention, U.S.-Baden, 16 Stat. 731, Malloy T.S No. 15,1 1776-1909,
at 53 (1910).
45 The court, however, did not explain why a series of bilateral treaties concluded by the U.S
in the 19th century with a group of German States which had subsequently lost their separate
identities (treaties which, moreover, had ceased to be in effect many decades before), much less
a Pan-American Convention of regional application and a codification treaty not in force be-
tween the litigating States, should be persuasive evidence of a rule of customary law.
46 S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.IJ. (Ser.A) No.1, at 25-28 (August 17)(advisory opinion). The
court here speaks of "consistent practice," gives examples and calls them precedents.
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applicable to an instance in which there was not a treaty.47 In the
Colombian-Peruvian Case,48 the court raised doubt on the utility of a
series of treaties with conflicting provisions and evincing no single line
of practice in the formation of customary international law. The court
stated that:
The facts brought to the knowledge of the court disclose so much uncer-
tainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the ex-
ercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various
occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession
of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others,
and the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of polit-
ical expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all
this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the
alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.49
In the Norwegian Fisheries Case,50 the variety of positions taken on
the ten mile closing line for bays led the ICJ to conclude that custom-
ary international law did not employ that measurement."' In the light
of the foregoing, a question may be asked about the value of arbitral
decisions in the formation of customary international law. Professor
Baxter has argued that a decision of an international tribunal, which
can arguendo be taken as legitimate evidence of international law, and
a bilateral treaty converge at the point of the decision creating a con-
ventional relation between the parties to the dispute. If the disputants
have agreed to submit the matter to arbitration or adjudication, they
have in effect delegated to the tribunal the function of establishing the
specific rules by which they will be bound, and that decision may be
looked upon as part of the treaty law binding the parties. As the tri-
bunal declared in the Martini Case:52
An international arbitral award constitutes a direct legal relationship be-
tween the two States. The arbitral award is rather of the nature of an
international treaty than of a decision of a national court. However,
while it may be technically correct to say that an arbitral award creates a
sort of conventional relation between the parties, this conclusion does
not really support the assertion that a bilateral treaty may be evidence of
international law. The persuasiveness of an arbitral award derives from
the fact that a third party has declared the law, and the treaty relation-
47 SOtRENSON, supra note 36, at 96. See CAROL WOLFE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 138 (1946); C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECrS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION 253-54 (1964).
48 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. Rep. 266, at 277 (Nov. 20).
49 Id.
50 Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. Rep. P. 116, at 131 (Dec.18).
51 Id. The court specifically alluded to the adoption of that rule by some States in "their
treaties and conventions" but found that other States had used other limits."
52 Martini Case (Italy. v. Venez.), 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 557 (1931).
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ship neither diminishes nor enhances the force of the award as evidence
of the law.
53
With regard to State practice, it has been contended that the re-
currence of identical provisions in a series of bilateral treaties like the
succession of bilateral air transport agreements modelled on the origi-
nal agreement between the U.K and the U.S at Bermuda in 1946-4
may create what amounts to a "form contract" or a particular formula
by which two States reconciled their differences; consequently, it may
commend itself to other States as a reasonable compromise of con-
flicting demands.55
A threshold issue that needs to be examined before delving into
BITs is whether a succession of similar bilateral treaties may legiti-
mately be employed of itself to establish the existence of a rule of
customary international law binding on all States. This issue was
clearly dealt with in the famous controversy between the U.K and the
U.S in 1916 concerning the removal by the British authorities of
Germans, some of whom were alleged to be naval reservists, from ves-
sels under the flag of the U.S, then a neutral. In defence of its con-
duct, the British Government referred to the considerable number of
treaties concluded between the two countries that permitted "military
persons" to be taken off neutral vessels.56 The U.S responded:
If these treaties can be regarded as representing a practice of nations, as
the British government suggest, it was a practice recognized as permissi-
ble only under treaty agreement. The government of the U.S is not
aware of any proof that these treaty provisions were declaratory of inter-
national law, or they were so considered at the time of their signature or
subsequently. The more reasonable view to take of them is that they
represent an exception to the general practice of nations, just as the rule
of "free ships, free goods", provided for in many of the same treaties,
was an exception to the practice of nations and was not generally
adopted until about the middle of the last century. This view is borne
out by the consistent practice of the U.S during the very period when
these treaties were in force.57
53 Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS, 27 (1970).
54 Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 3 U.N.T.S 253.
55 There are, for example, bilateral treaties modeled on the compromise that was adopted at
the Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Modifying
the Convention of 24 June 1901, Apr. 27, 1959, Den.-Gr.Brit., 337 U.N.T.S 416. See Dean, The
Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 Am. J.
INT'L L. 751, 773-782 (1960).
56 Memorandum from British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Grey) to American
Ambassador in Britain (Page), (July 15, 1916), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
653, 654 (Supp. 1916).
57 Memorandum from Secretary of State to American Ambassador in Great Britain (Page),
(Dec 1, 1916), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF T=E UNITED STATES 667, 669 (Supp. 1916); Wm. W.
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It is contended that a bilateral treaty can be understood to be in dero-
gation of the law if the state of customary international law is such
that the activity dealt with lies exclusively within the sovereign do-
main of a State. For example, a State has no legal obligation to estab-
lish postal, telephone, radio or television relations with another State.
States are also not obliged to resort to judicial settlement of interna-
tional disputes unless they specifically agree.5" There is also no gen-
eral duty to extradite, and a State commits no violation of
international law in refusing to hand a fugitive in the absence of a
treaty.59 Because of the sovereignty that a State enjoys in the airspace
over its territory,60 it is under no obligation, in the absence of a treaty,
to allow the civil aircraft of other States to fly over its territory or to
land on it. It is important to note that a large corpus of treaties often
similar in form exist dealing with the various subjects itemized above.
The multiplicity of treaties of extradition or air transport agreements
does nothing to prove a rule of customary international law.6'
In the light of the foregoing analysis of bilateral agreements as
possible vehicles for the creation of customary international law, it
now remains to be seen whether bilateral investment agreements have
led to the creation of customary international law governing interna-
tional investments. Instead of considering the entire landscape cov-
ered by BITs, specific aspects will be considered and carefully
analyzed.
IV. DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
Article I of the U.K-Singapore Treaty62 can be taken as represen-
tative of the types of property listed as being protected by the treaty.
The term investment in the treaty is defined as including: (i) movable
and immovable property and property rights such as mortgages, liens
and pledges, (ii) shares, stocks and debentures in companies and other
interests in companies, (iii) claims to money or to any other perform-
ance under contracts having a financial value, (iv) intellectual prop-
erty rights and goodwill, (v) business concessions including
concessions relating to natural resources.
Bishop, General Course of Public International Law, 115 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEIL DES
CouRs 147, 229-30 (1965).
58 Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.IJ, (Ser. B) No. 5, at 27 (July 23)(advisory opinion).
59 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (1955) (Launterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
60 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 15 U.N.T.S 296.
61 See Baxter, supra note 53, at 99.
62 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 22, 1975, Sing.-Gr.
Brit., 15 LL.M. 591 (1975).
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The American model BIT contains a longer list which includes
besides the five categories listed above, "licenses and permits issued
pursuant to law, including those issued for manufacture and sale of
products," and "any right conferred by law or contract, including
rights to search for or utilize natural resources," and "to rights to man-
ufacture and sell products. '63 The latter rights are protected by do-
mestic law unlike intellectual property rights which are protected by
international conventions64 or concession rights which are regarded as
internationalized in some arbitral awards.65
The bilateral investment treaties have contributed to the expan-
sion of a concept of property in international law to include intellec-
tual property rights as well. Such a trend had already emerged and is
strengthened by the treaties which contain evidence of what the par-
ticipating states include within the notion of property. Prior to the
foregoing developments, diplomatic protection of property concerned
the tangible property of aliens. Works on state responsibility or diplo-
matic protection seldom referred to the protection of intangible prop-
erty such as patents, copyright and know-how. For example, Professor
Verdross, writing in 1931, excluded from his definition of property rec-
ognized by international law, "so-called literary[,] artistic and indus-
trial property. '66 A sizable number of treaties, judicial decisions and
arbitral awards have defined the concept of property in international
law to include intangible property and intellectual property rights.
The bilateral investment treaties confirm these trends and give a clear
indication as to the extent of property that is protected. Incre-
mentally, the BITs have elaborated and clarified the definition of
what amounts to property. This is a particularly important develop-
63 Treaty Between the United States of America and ... Concerning the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of Investment (January 11, 1982) in U.S Export Weekly (BNA) No. 400,
at 734 (March 23, 1982), art. 1(c) V and VI of the Model Treaty.
64 The Paris Convention For the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, 2 Malloy 1935.
65 See, e.g., Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1978); Losinger & Cie, 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. C), No.
78, at 32; Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 1952 18 I.L.R. 149; Sapphire
Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 18 I.L.R. 175-76 (1963); Revere Copper Brass
Inc. OPIC 56 I.L.R. 271-72. For a contrary view, see M. Sonarajah, The Myth of International
Contract Law, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 187 (1981).
66 A. Verdross, Les Rfgles Internationals Concernant le Traitement des Etrangeres, 37
RECUEIL DES CouRs 327, 364 (1931). See GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONAuZATION OF FOREIGN
PROPERTY 48-49, (1961). It is important to note however that the Intellectual Property was
protected from as far back as 1883 with the signing of the Paris Convention on the Protection of
Intellectual Property, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S No. 4931, 828 U.N.T.S 107 (Revised at Lisbon on




ment given the fact that much value is attached to the transfer of tech-
nology in modem investment contracts such as joint venture
agreements in which the protection of intellectual property is of para-
mount importance.
V. APPROVED INVESTMENTS
Protection under bilateral investment treaties is usually given to
investments that are approved by the contracting parties. In effect,
this creates two categories of alien property: one that is protected by
the terms of the treaty and the other by the other ordinary principles
of public international law on the protection of alien property. The
creation of these two categories of alien property explicitly manifests
the lex specialis nature of BITs. Distinctions between approved and
unapproved investment comes about as a result of states seeking to
control the entry of foreign investment on the basis of assessments of
the effect of such investments on their economy or their national se-
curity.67 Many of the legislative devices adopted would seek to im-
pose certain requirements like the meeting of production quotas, the
67 States have rejected the argument of classical economics to the effect that all foreign in-
vestment flows are beneficial to developing countries. For a contrary argument, see White House
Policy Statement on Economic Assistance and Investment Security In Developing Countries, 11
I.L.M. 239 (1972). Some developed countries now also have restrictions on the investment that
enters the country from abroad. For Canada, see Alan Rugman, The Regulation of Foreign
Investment in Canada, 11 J.W. TR. L. 323 (1977); Andrews, An Evaluation of Foreign Investment
in Canada, 8 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 164 (1978); For the U.S, see Jose Alvarez, Political Protection-
ism and United States Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exxon-Florio, VA. J.
INT'L L. 3 (1989). The Exxon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Act. Pub. L. No. 100-418
art. 5021, 102 Stat. 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. Art. 2170 (Supp. 1989). This Amendment
grants the President discretionary authority to block, for national security reasons, mergers, ac-
quisitions and takeovers which would result in "foreign control of persons engaged in interstate
commerce." Opponents of Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. regard it as a threat to "na-
tional security," because foreign ownership of a defence contractor may compromise confiden-
tial information; may threaten access to critical technology or equipment (particularly if
production is moved off-shore); may seriously damage domestic producers of critical compo-
nents thereby making the U.S. further dependent on foreign sources of supply; or may result in
redirecting investment or research and development away from the U.S defense needs. Foreign
portfolio investment is also regarded as potentially threatening to the "national economic inter-
est" because a withdrawal of foreign funds could seriously disrupt the economy." See Alvarez,
supra, at 5. See also MARTIN ToLcHiN & SUSAN TOLCHiN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOR-
EiGN MONEY IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 219, 261-64, (1988); Note, The Rising
Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate U.S. Treaty Commitment?, 72
MICH. L. REv. 552 (1974); Mark L. Hanson, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in the
U.S. Defense Industry, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 658,672-74 (1989); Cynthia Mitchell, WALL ST.
J., April 28, 1988 at 1; Schwarz, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Defense Companies: Where do we
Draw the Line? F.P.I. Policy Briefs: Foreign Ownership Of U.S. Defense Companies (1989); N.
GciEMAN & D. WOODwARD, THE NEW CoMpvmrroas: How FOREIoN INvESToRS ARE
CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY (1989).
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export of certain percentage of the product, compulsory employment
of a percentage of local personnel and transfer of technology to local
owners.68 Such legislation also seek to ensure that foreign investors
do not engage in restrictive business practices, transfer pricing and
other conduct which may harm the development aim of the country.
Where an investor is held to be in breach of such regulations by the
host state, the investor loses the protection given by the BIT. On ac-
count of the foregoing, the role of BITs in the protection of foreign
investment becomes very limited.69
Singapore's BITs are indicative of the attitude of most developing
countries on protection of only approved investments even though
Singapore is generally a country that favors foreign investment. For
example, Singapore refused to enter into a BIT with the U.S based on
the model treaty, the clause requiring the prohibition of performance
requirements being one of the reasons for the refusal.70 Singapore's
BITs with the U.K and France contains specific articles limiting pro-
tection to "investments made before or after the coming into force of
this agreement which are specifically approved in writing. ' 71 In Singa-
pore's treaty with the Netherlands, the obligation is one sided, Singa-
pore giving protection only to approved investments, whereas the
68 B. ROCHMAT, CONTRACrUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN OIL AND GAS MINING ENTERPRISES IN
INDoNEsIA (1981).
69 The U.S model BIT seeks to avoid such screening devices in the interests of free flows of
investment. See Lionel H. Ohmer, Barriers to U.S Foreign Investment, in SoumwErRN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 63 (1983). The model U.S BIT is against perform-
ance requirements and sees them as inhibiting free flow of capital from the developed to the
developing countries.
70 The failure of the negotiations was attributed to five causes: Singapore's refusal to include
a taxation provision in the BIT, disagreement over the inclusion of a custom's union exception,
U.S opposition to a provision requiring the exhaustion of local remedies by investors prior to
seeking diplomatic redress, Singapore's insistence on applying the BIT's protection only to ap-
proved investments, and Singapore's opposition to retroactive application of the BIT to invest-
ments made prior to, and existing at the time of, the effective date of the BIT. See American
Society of International Law, Unofficial Report of the Corporate Consultation (July 10, 1980).
71 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 22, 1975, Gr. Brit.-
Sing., art. 12, 1018 U.N.T.S. 175; France-Singapore Treaty, September 8, 1975, art. 9, U.N.T.S.
1965; Swiss-Singapore BIT, March 6, 1978, art 1(2), U.N.T.S. 1979. Article 1(2) of the Singa-
pore-Swiss BIT provides that:
The making of investments by nationals or companies of one contracting party in the terri-
tory of the other contracting party shall comply with such admission procedures as may be
established by that other contracting party. Only an investment so admitted and, to the
extent that a written approval is required, specifically approved in writing by that other
contracting party as an admitted investment, shall enjoy the benefits and protection of this
agreement.
It is important to note that the British BITs with Paraguay and Bangladesh do not contain an
approval of investments clause. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, June 19, 1980, Gr. Brit.-BangI., Brit. T.S. No. 73.
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Netherlands promised protection to all investments made by Singa-
pore's nationals.72 In Singapore's treaty with Germany, the term "in-
vestment" is defined to refer only to investments approved by
Singapore.7a The Sweden-PRC treaty contains no express "prior ap-
proval" clause. Under Article 8, the treaty applies to all investments
made after July 1, 1979.71 The definition of "investment" in the treaty
contains a qualification not found in the British, French, Swiss, Dutch
and German treaties. Article 1 provides that the term "investment"
shall comprise "every kind of asset invested by the investors of one
contracting state in the territory of the other contracting state in ac-
cordance with the laws and regulations of that state.. ."75 The effect
of this provision is to incorporate any legislation mandating approval
of investments by the PRC prior to the entry of the investor. In a
study of 335 BITs done by the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes(ICSID), it was found that 126 BITs (over 1/3
of which are German) provide that the contracting parties shall admit
such investment in accordance with their legislation.76 Fifty-four BITs
contain the same provision with the addition of "regulations and/or
administrative practices.77 In 59 BITs, of which 42 are U.K, seven
Dutch, and three Belgian BITs, the obligation to admit a foreign in-
vestment is subject to the contracting parties' right to exercise powers
conferred on them by their national legislation. In nine BITs, the con-
tracting parties merely require that each endeavour to admit such in-
vestments be subject to their laws and regulations.78 Fifteen BITs,
including two of the three Belgian BITs referred to above, expressly
preserve the right of each party to decide its own economic policies
notwithstanding the provisions of the BIT.7 9 Fourteen BITs provide
72 Agreement on Economic Co-operation, May 16, 1972, Neth.-Sing., art. 12(a)-(b), 919
U.N.T.S 87.
73 Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Oct. 3, 1973,
F.D.R.-Sing., art. 1, 1008 U.N.T.S 221. Art. 1(ii) provides that in respect of investments in the
territory of the Republic of Singapore, investments shall mean "all investments approved in
writing by the Government of the Republic of Singapore irrespective of whether these invest-
ments were made before or after the coming into force of the present treaty."
74 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982, P.RC.-Swed., art. 8,
21 I.L.M. 477, 478.
75 Id. art. 1, at 477.
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that the obligation to admit the investment shall be in accordance with
the national or most favored nation treatment.80
From the foregoing, one can clearly deduce the customary rule
that foreign investments are subject to local laws and regulations
which may require inter-alia, prior approval unless the BITs provide
otherwise. The disparities in the parameters used to determine pro-
tected alien investments in different BITs militates against an argu-
ment to the effect that BITs are necessarily indicative of customary
international law.
VI. CoRPoRATE NATIONALrrY
Prior to 1970, the ICJ had not developed a consistent doctrine
establishing when a State may intervene on behalf of one of its nation-
als whose shareholding in a foreign corporation had been damaged."'
When foreign investment was not concerned, it was settled law that
when nationals had been directly injured by a foreign State's actions,
and those nationals had sufficiently exhausted all local remedies, then
their State could commence international proceedings on their be-
half.82 The ability of shareholders to enforce their rights hinged on
the municipal law applicable to the corporation. 83 Under the Munici-
pal law of some States, only the corporate entity that had been
harmed could assert a claim to vindicate its rights, not the sharehold-
ers of that corporate entity. In such circumstances, foreign sharehold-
80 Id. See G. Gallins, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 . NAT. RESOURCES L. 77 (1984); M.
Sonarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79
(1986); itirgen Voss, The Promotion and Protection of European Private Investment in Develop-
ing Countries, 18 C.M.L.R. 363 (1981).
81 Before 1970, the most cited precedent involving shareholder rights was the Delagoa Bay
Railway Case in 2 J.B. MOORE, INTERNA-IONAL ARBrrRATiONs 1865 (1898). In this case, a
British corporation held shares in a Portuguese corporation and American nationals were share-
holders in the British corporation. The Portuguese Government had seized a railway owned by
the Portuguese corporation. Consequently, the British Government brought suit against the
Portuguese Government to compensate the injured interests of the British corporation. The
British Government argued that since the Portuguese corporation was practically defunct, the
British corporation had no shareholder remedy except through the intervention of its own gov-
ernment. Similarly, the United States contended that its nationals were also without remedy,
and it should be permitted to intervene on behalf of both United States and British shareholders.
The question of compensation was ultimately referred by the three Governments to arbitration.
See Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals, With Particular Refer-
ence to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Rights of Shareholders, BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 172-73
(1959) (citing J.B. MOORE, 2 INTMRNATIONAL ARrrArioNs 1865 (1898)).
82 Bagge, supra note 81, at 164-67. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess.,
Supp. No.10, at 187, U.N. Doe. A/33/10 (1979).
83 Bagge, supra note 81, at 169.
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ers might lose a substantial portion of their investment since
municipal law prevented the investor from being able to pursue an
effective remedy for damage inflicted by the State against the corpo-
ration. Thus, questions were raised whether customary international
law required that foreign shareholders be afforded some legal protec-
tion notwithstanding a contrary determination under municipal law.84
In Barcelona Traction Case85 the ICJ decisively concluded that foreign
shareholders had no right under customary international law to assert
a damage claim on their own behalf against the State of incorporation.
The company, Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Ltd was incor-
porated under Canadian law in 1911 and provided electric service in
Spain through its Spanish subsidiaries. Eighty-eight per cent of the
company was owned by Belgian nationals.8 6 As a result of the Span-
ish civil war, servicing of the company's bonds was suspended, and
although payment of interest on the company's peseta bonds was re-
sumed in 1940, the Spanish government refused to authorize foreign
currency transfers that would have enabled the company to meet its
interest payments on its sterling bonds.87 By February 1948, a Spanish
court had declared the company bankrupt. The trustees then decided
that new shares in the subsidiary companies would be issued and sold
at public auction, while shares owned by foreigners would be can-
celled. Consequently, Belgium brought suit against Spain before the
court seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by Belgian na-
tionals. Spain challenged Belgium's standing to bring the claim, argu-
ing that municipal law permitted only the company itself to seek
compensation. The majority of the court upheld the Spanish objec-
tion, stating that:
[T]he mere fact that damage is sustained by both the company and
shareholder does not imply that both are entitled to claim compensation
... Thus whenever a shareholder's interests are harmed by an act done
to the company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropri-
ate action; for although two separate limits may have suffered from the
same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed... 8
84 Bagge, supra note 81, at 169-70.
85 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 4,7
(Feb. 5)(Second Phase).
86 Id. at 12.
87 Id. at 8.
88 Id. at para. 36.
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The court thus conditioned Belgium's standing upon the nationality of
Barcelona Traction.8 9 Since Barcelona Traction was not a Belgian
company, the court concluded that diplomatic protection could only
be invoked by Canada, the State of incorporation 0
The Barcelona Traction decision rested on the court's fear that
multiple claims and proceedings would result should the holder of one
percent interest in a company and ninety percent holder equally enjoy
the benefit of legal protection. The court specifically pointed out that
a contrary holding "could create an atmosphere of confusion and inse-
curity in international economic relations."91 The court acknowl-
edged, however, that foreign shareholders did have remedies at the
international level in two exceptional cases. First, Barcelona Traction
recognized a remedy for foreign shareholders under customary inter-
national law if they were deprived of their "direct rights" as opposed
to their "interests " in the companyY2 These rights, the court said,
included the right to any declared dividend, the right to attend and
vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual assets of the
company on liquidation. Whenever one of his direct rights is in-
fringed, the shareholder the court said, had an independent right of
action.93 The court emphasized, however, the distinction between a
direct infringement of the shareholder's rights and difficulties or fi-
nancial losses to which he may be exposed as the result of the situa-
tion of the company which are not justiciable except through the
company.94 Second, the court said that the Barcelona Traction rule
89 See Comment, Belgian Nationality of Shareholders in Canadian Corporation Held Insuffi-
cient to Give Belgium Standing to Sue on Behalf of the Shareholders in the International Court of
Justice, 3 N.Y.UJ. INr'L L. & Pot. 391, 393 (1970).
90 Wo dominant theories have evolved to determine the nationality of a corporate entity. In
the United States and the common law countries, a corporation is a national of the State in
which it is incorporated. In the civil law countries, the "seat of control," e.g. the ... location of
the head office of the company, determines the nationality of the corporation. See Soci6t6 Con-
str. Ltd v. Brown, 1897 JOURNAL Du PALAIS 84,1897 JOURNAL DE TRIBUNAUX DrC COMMERCE
552. Since Belgium failed to meet the criteria of either theory, it argued that an exception to the
nationality test should be established, requiring the "corporate veil" to be pierced to reveal the
nationality of the shareholders. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. at para. 39. Belgium pointed
out that international law had disregarded the corporate entity in several situations, such as in
Enemy Property Legislation. See Comment, supra note 89, at 394. However, the court rejected
Belgium's contention, stating that these practices were "distinctive processes," arising out of
circumstances peculiar to the respective situations "rather than evidence of customary interna-
tional law." Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at para. 39.
91 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at para. 49.
92 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at para. 36.
93 Id. at para. 47.
94 Id. at para. 47.
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would not apply where a breach of a treaty provision is involved. The
court pointed out that
[T]he Belgian Government would be entitled to bring a claim if it could
show that one of its rights had been infringed and that the acts com-
plained of involved the breach of an international obligation arising out
of a treaty.. .95
In the judgment, the court referred to the growth of MNCs within the
international economy and expressed surprise that there had been lit-
tle development towards securing greater protection for investments
by NCs.96 The court indicated clearly that the best technique for
protecting shareholders may be in bilateral and multilateral arrange-
ments on investment protection. The court stated:
Thus, in the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders re-
quires that recourse be made to treaty stipulation or special agreements
directly concluded between the private investor and the State in which
the investment is placed. States ever more frequently provide for such
protection, in both bilateral and multilateral relations, either by means
of special instruments or within the means of wider economic arrange-
ments. Indeed, whether in the form of bilateral or multilateral treaties
between States, or in that of agreements between States and companies,
there has since the second world war been considerable development in
the protection of foreign investments. The instruments in question con-
tain provisions as to jurisdiction and procedure in the case of disputes
concerning the treatment of investing companies by the States in which
they invest their capital. Sometimes companies are themselves vested
with a direct right to defend their interests against States through pre-
scribed procedures. No such instrument is in force between the parties
to the present case.97
The court thus recognized that, notwithstanding customary interna-
tional law, nations could create treaties that amplify the rights of their
nationals as shareholders in foreign corporations." This decision con-
tributed significantly to the impetus leading to the conclusion of BITs
95 Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. at para. 46.
96 The court's decision received tremendous criticism. See Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the
Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 327
(1971); Richard B. Lillich, The Rigidity of Barcelona, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 522 (1971).
97 Barcelona RTaction, supra note 85, at para. 90. On the protection of corporate interests
before the Barcelona Decision, see generally BATTAGLNI, LA PRoTEZIONE DIPLOMATICA
DELLE SocEmAs (1957); P. De Visscher, La Protection Diplomatique des Personnes Morales, 102
RECUEIL DES CoURs 399 (1961); HOCHEPIED, LA PROTEION DIPLOMATIQUE DES SoCIEmEs
AcHONNAIRES (1965); CAFtuscH, LA PROTECTION DipLOMATIQUE DES SOCIETES ET DES INTER-
ETs INDmEcrs EN DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, LA HAYE (1969); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem,
The Impact of Public International Law on Conflicts of Law Rules on Corporations, 123
RECUEIL DES COORS 1 (1968).
98 See a similar argument that was made by the United Kingdom in the Romano-Americana
Case, 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIO. OF INT'L L. 840, 841, 843 (1943).
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as it created doubt as to whether and when diplomatic protection of
the interests of shareholders is permissible in international law.99 The
BITs remove such doubts as far as the protection of shareholders is
concerned. Whatever the position is in public international law, it is
clear that because the definition of investments in the treaties includes
shares, the diplomatic protection of shareholders who are nationals of
States parties to these treaties is permissible. Here, the effect of the
BITs has been to create a special regime of protection because the
international law position on the protection of shareholders was and
continues to remain unclear.100
The I.C.J got a chance to reconsider the juridical soundness of
Barcelona Traction in the case of Ellectronica Sicula S.P.A (ELSI)
(U.S. Italy) Case.'0 ' The case came within the purview of the U.S.-
Italy Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation (FCN).' 2 In this
case, the ICJ vindicated its views in the Barcelona Traction case about
the utility of BITs and FCNs in the light of its decision in Barcelona.
Throughout its pleadings and oral arguments before the court, Italy
contended that the rights of foreign investors in locally incorporated
subsidiaries are not protected with respect to actions against those
subsidiaries by the host government. In essence, Italy attempted to
99 On the protection of shareholders and corporations in international law, see David Harris,
The Protection of Companies in International Law in the Light of the Nottebohm Case, 18 INr'L
& Comp. L.Q. 275 (1969); Mervyn Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who are Nationals of
Foreign Companies, 26 Birr. Y.B. INT'L L 225 (1949).
The U.S-Thrkey Treaty defines "investment" as "every kind of investment in the territory of
one party owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals or companies of the other
party, including assets, equity, debt, claims, and service and investment contracts" as well as
"intellectual and industrial property rights including rights with respect to copyrights, patents,
trademark, trade names, industrial designs, trade secrets and knowhow, and goodwill." See U.S.-
Turkey BIT, Dec. 3, 1985, art. 1(1)(c), 25 I.L.M. 87, 88. The France-China BIT defines "invest-
ment" in substantially similar terms. However, unlike the U.S-Thrkey BIT, it includes within the
definition of investments "[r]ights granted under the law, particularly with respect to the cultiva-
tion, prospection, mining, or exploitation of natural resources, including those situated in the
maritime zones of the contracting parties. See France-China BIT, May 30, 1984, art. 1(1)(e), 24
I.L.M 550, 551. The Germany-Singapore BIT defines investments as including inter-alia shares
or other kinds of interest in companies. Germany-Singapore BIT, Oct. 3, 1973, art. 1(b), 1008
U.N.T.S. 221, 229.
100 If the view of the court in Barcelona Traction is accepted, they have no protection except
through the company. But some judges, like Fitzmaurice (In his separate but concurring opin-
ion, para. 86) contemplated such protection at least as lex ferenda. See Note, The Case of Elec-
tronica Sicula SPA: Toward Greater Protection of Shareholders Rights in Foreign Investments, 29
COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215 (1991); F.A. Mann, Foreign Investment in the ICJ: The Elsi Case,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1992); F.A Mann, Protection of Shareholder Interests in FURTHER STUDIaS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 232 (1992).
101 Ellectronica Sicula S.P.A [ELSI] Case (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).




view Ellectronica Sicula through the prism of customary international
law.103 The court however expertly chose not to limit the vital provi-
sions of the FCN by the Barcelona Traction rule and thus ensured the
treaty's effectiveness as a vehicle for the protecting foreign invest-
ment.104 In essence, in the absence of a BIT or FCN, the rule enunci-
ated in Barcelona still stands as the law-that shareholder interests
constitute indirect interests which do not warrant international legal
protection and a claimant State cannot espouse the claim of its na-
tional who have invested in foreign corporations absent treaties or
agreements specifying otherwise. The ICJ refused adamantly to heed
the protestations of Judge Oda whose separate but concurring opinion
dwelt almost entirely on the Barcelona Traction decision.105
The plethora of BITs do not shed much light on the issue of cor-
porate nationality. Some BITs are expertly tailored to clearly avoid
the operation of the Barcelona rule. In the U.K-Singapore treaty, for
the purpose of bringing arbitration proceedings before the Interna-
tional Convention On the Settlement of Investment Disputes (herein-
after ICSID), the agreement treats a company incorporated in
Singapore as a British company provided that the majority of the
shares of the company are held by the British nationals. This position
accords with Article 25(2)(b) of ICSID. 1°6 This provision is a feature
103 See Statement of Ambassador Richard Gardner before the ICJ (U.S. v. Spain), 1989 I.C.J.
Pleadings (Case Concerning Ellectronica Sicula S.P.A-Elsi) 29 (Feb. 15).
104 The outcome of this decision demonstrates clearly the importance of maintaining a wide
network of BITs designed to promote and also protect foreign investment by giving investors
rights which they would otherwise not have under customary international law.
105 According to Judge Oda, the U.S-Italy FCN Treaty was not intended to alter the share-
holder's status or augment their rights in any way. He said:
Can it be presumed that any of these rights guaranteed to United States corporations under
the 1948 FCN Treaty are relevant to those of Raytheon and Matchlett as shareholders of
Elsi? The treaty guarantees the right of the United States to hold as much as 100 per cent of
the stock of an Italian company. Yet there is no reason to interpret the [U.S-Italy] FCN
treaty as having granted to those nationals or corporations of one State party that hold
shares in a corporation of the other State party further rights in addition to those to which
the same shareholders would have been entitled under Italian law as well as under the
general principles of [municipal] company law.
Elsi Case, 1989 I.CJ. at 88-89 (concurring opinion of Judge Oda). To Judge Oda, a bilateral
treaty does not change the nature of rights acquired by shareholders. He advocated the continu-
ance of the rigid rule laid down in Barcelona and as far as he was concerned, the FCN did not
mitigate or oust the operation of the rule. This, the court refused to accede to and justifiably so,
particularly for the foreign investor.
106 Under Article 25(2) of ICSID, parties could treat any juridical person having the national-
ity of one party as the national of the other party because of foreign control. An investment
treaty may amount to prior agreement that nationality should depend not on incorporation but
on control.
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of BITs to which the U.K and many other countries are parties to'0
7
and provides support for the view that as far as arbitration of invest-
ment is concerned, it is plausible to hold that the test of corporate
nationality is the nationality of the majority of the shareholders of the
company where actual control resides. On the other hand, there is no
consistency in the theory of corporate nationality adopted in the BITs
and they serve to show the competing theories on corporate national-
ity used in different treaties. For example, the Japanese-Sri Lanka
Treaty of 1982 uses a test of "control or decisive influence" in deter-
mining corporate nationality but leaves the application of the test it-
self to the bona fide decision of the party in whose territory the
investment is made.10 8 The practice of single States varies between
the theory of incorporation which is the prevailing view in common
law jurisdictions and the "si~ge sociale" theory which is favored in the
civil law jurisdictions. 1°9 It is not surprising that the Singapore-U.K
BIT defines a British company as a company incorporated in Britain,
whereas Singapore-Federal Republic of Germany BIT defines a Ger-
man company as "one having its seat in Germany." Whereas the in-
corporation theory is preferred in the treaty with Singapore, the U.K-
Philippines BIT opts for the si~ge sociale theory when it defines a
protected company as one "actually doing business under the laws in
force in any part of the territory of that contracting party wherein
place of effective management is situated."
In sum, however, the treaties contribute to the clarification of the
international law on corporate nationality to the extend that they
bring to light the competing theories on this subject between the com-
mon law position and that one favored by the continental system. To
this extent, the provisions in them on shareholder protection do not
contribute to the creation of any customary rule on this question and
their very presence could be evidence of an acknowledgement that in
their absence, diplomatic protection of the shareholders is not possi-
ble. To the extend that this is so, the legal position propounded by the
ICJ in the Barcelona Traction remains the general principle both on
107 See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 27, 1976, U.K.-
Indon., art. 7(2), 1074 U.N.T.S. 195,198; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Dec. 3, 1980, U.K.-Phil., art. X(2), 1981 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 7 (Cmnd. 8148), at 7; Agree-
ment for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May, 21, 1981, U.K.-Malay., art. 7(1),
1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 16 (Cmnd. 707).
108 Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Mar. 1,1982, Japan-
Sri Lanka, art.12(2), 21 I.L.M. 963, 968.
109 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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the protection of shareholders as well as on corporate nationality, for,
on the latter point, the BITs do not show any consistent practice.
VII. REPATRIATION OF PROFITS
There is a general agreement that the timely transfer of income
from investment capital, and the repatriation of capital in the event of
disinvestment, whether forcible or voluntary, significantly contributes
to a stable and equitable investment climate for foreign private direct
investment. Many BITs however refer to the unimpaired right of the
host State during periods of exchange stringency, to apply exchange
restrictions to the extent necessary to assure the availability of foreign
exchange for payment for goods and services essential to the health
and welfare of its people. The Egypt-U.K agreement for example
guarantees the transfer of the returns from the investments of the na-
tionals of the other party.110 This guarantee is subject, however, to
each party's right, in exceptional financial or economic circumstances,
to exercise equitably and in good faith powers conferred by its laws."'
The Singapore-U.K agreement has identical provisions, with the ex-
ception that the transfer of returns on capital is also to be effected in
accordance with the law of the contracting parties.' Under the Phil-
110 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, June 11, 1975, U.K.-Egypt,
art. 6(1), Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 97 (Cmnd. 6638), at 5.
111 Id. The BIT between China and France contains an elaborate provision safeguarding the
transfer of funds by foreign investors. It provides that each contracting party in whose territory
or maritime zones investment have been made by investors of the other party "shall accord such
investors the free transfer of... interest, dividends, profits and other current yields ... royalties
derived from... intangible rights ... payments made in reimbursement of regularly contracted
loans ... proceeds from the assignment or the partial or complete liquidation of the investment
and compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalization." Agreement Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, May 30, 1984, Fr.-P.R.C., art. 5, 24
I.L.M. at 554 (1985). Such transfers shall be made "within a reasonable period of time at the
prevailing official rate of exchange on the date of transfer." Id.
Unlike the France-P.R.C BIT, the U.S.-Turkey BIT expressly permits transfers related to an
investment to be made into, as well as out of, the host state. It also provides that each party shall
permit transfers "freely and without delay." Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments, U.S.-TIrkey, supra note 99, art. IV(1), at 93. The protocol to the
U.S-Turkey BIT permits Turkey "[i]n exceptional financial or economic circumstances relating
to foreign exchange to temporarily delay transfers involving proceeds from the sale or liquida-
tion of all or any part of an investment." Id. Protocol 1, para. 2(b), at 101. However, such delays
must comply with Article II of the treaty i.e they must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. Id. art.
H(3), at 90. However, such delays instituted by Turkey must not exceed three years from the
date on which the transfer is requested and may only be maintained "for the time period neces-
sary to restore its reserves of foreign exchange to a minimally acceptable level." Id. Protocol I
2(b), at 101.
112 Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, F.D.R.-Sing.,
supra note 73, art. 6.
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ippine-U.K agreement, the right of investors in each state to the free
transfer of capital is similarly preserved. Each party, however, can
delay repatriation under more extensive conditions. The right of re-
patriation is made specifically subject to the right of the government
"to impose equitably and in good faith such measures as may be nec-
essary to safeguard the integrity and independence of its currency, its
external financial position and balance of payments. 13 The state's
right to delay should be exercised consistently with its right as a mem-
ber of the International Monetary Fund. The agreement provides that
where large amounts are involved, the contracting state may require
that transfers be effected in reasonable installments.114 The agree-
ment also states that the applicable exchange rate for transfers is the
rate prevailing at the time of the remittance.115
Under the U.S.-Romania Agreement,116 the right to expropria-
tion is unrestricted provided the initial importation of such capital or
currencies was done in an authorized manner. Article 6 of the agree-
ment applies a most favored nation standard to the repatriation of
"funds or financial instruments" between the territories of the two
states.'17 The Sri Lanka-Switzerland agreement" 8 is more expansive
regarding the right to repatriation of funds. First, a provision which
applies specifically to repatriation of compensation funds stipulates
that such amounts are freely transferable at the official rate of ex-
change prevailing on the date used for the determination of value.119
Secondly, the agreement provides for a more general right to repatri-
ate capital and returns.120 Finally, amortization and contractual re-
payments such as loan servicing, amounts assigned to cover
management fees and new capital required for the maintenance or
development of investment are freely transferable.' 2'
113 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-PhiI., supra note 107,
art. VII(), at 6.
114 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-PhiI., supra note 107,
art. VII(3), at 3.
115 Id. art. VII(2), at 6.
116 Agreement on Trade Relations, Apr. 2, 1975, U.S.-Rom., art. VI(2), 26 U.S.T. 2306,2311-
12.
117 Id. art. VI(1), at 2311.
118 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 23, 1981,
Sri Lanka-Switz., 21 I.L.M. 399 (1982).
119 Id. art. 6, at 403.
120 Id. art. 7(1), at 403.
121 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 7(2), at 403.
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The China-Sweden agreement provides for a right to the transfer
of funds "without undue delay." 22 The grounds for delay, however,
are not as specific as, for example, the grounds stated in the Philip-
pines-U.K. Agreement. 23  The France-Morocco Agreement12 4 man-
dates that the contracting parties authorize certain transfers of
investment properties, namely "net real profits, interest and dividends
accruing to investors.., who are nationals of one of the two countries;
royalties and loan repayments derived from validly concluded con-
tracts; [and] proceeds of the complete or partial liquidation of invest-
ments."" The agreement further stipulates that the rate of exchange
of these transfers shall be that in force on the day of the transfer on
the official exchange market of the country from which the transfers
are effected. 26 In the ICSID study, of the 335 BITs surveyed, all pro-
vide that such proceeds shall be transferred without delay. Neverthe-
less, more than 60 BITs provide for transfer of such sums in
installments by taking into account the balance of payment of the host
country; 22 BITs provide for the payment of interest in case of delay.
195 BITs provide for the rate of exchange in the event of delay. 131
of these treaties stipulate the official and/or the market rate of ex-
change and 64 refer to the IMF exchange regulations in this respect.127
From the foregoing examination of the principles distilled in the
various BITs, it is evident that the right to repatriate cannot bind a
state in times of economic stringency. The doctrine of clausula rebus
sic stantibus, under which the treaty rights exist only while the circum-
stances under which the treaty was entered into continue, can be in-
yoked in support of this view.'28 In this regard, the BITs have served
to reiterate the universally accepted international law position on re-
patriation of invested funds.
122 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Swed., supra note 74, art. 4,
at 477.
123 The agreement specifically states that "the compensation shall be made without undue
delay, shall be effectively realizable and shall... be freely transferable." Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Phil., supra note 107, art. 5(1), at 5.
124 Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection, Encouragement and Guarantee of Investments,
July 15, 1975, Fr.-Morocco, art. 6, 1036 U.N.T.S. 348.
125 Id. art. 6, at 349.
126 Id.
127 Khalil, supra note 76, at 353-58.
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VIII. EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Compensation for nationalization of alien property has been a
controversial area in international law.12 9' The developing countries
have collectively supported the position that the issue of compensa-
tion is one to be decided solely by their tribunals. Their collective
position has been embodied in several United Nations General As-
sembly Resolutions.' The developed countries in their turn have in-
sisted upon a standard for compensation which requires the payment
of appropriate compensation that accords with international legal
standards as exemplified in the Hull formula of "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation." Whereas developing countries have a
common stance in international fora, their bilateral agreements with
most of the developed countries do not run in tandem with their
avowed position in the U.N. General Assembly which situation
manifests an amount of duplicity on their part.
In the Egypt-U.K. BIT, the relevant provision stipulates that in-
vestments are not to be nationalized or expropriated except for a pub-
lic purpose "related to the internal needs" of the host state.131 If
nationalization is carried out, the state must pay "prompt, adequate
and effective" compensation. Such compensation should be
equivalent to the market value of the investment expropriated as it
stood either immediately before the expropriatory measure, or before
there was an official government announcement of the intention to
expropriate, whichever occurs earlier.132 The Singapore-U.K. BIT133
provides for similar measures with the addition of interest on the
amount of compensation payable until the date of payment of the
principal sum, and at such rate as may be prescribed by the law.134
The Philippines-U.K. BIT extends the grounds for expropriation be-
yond the public purpose ideas, and covers "interests of the national
defense." The agreement mentions "just" compensation rather than
129 See Rudolph Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75
AM. J. Ir'L L. 533 (1981); M. Sornarajah, Compensation for Expropriation; The Emergence of
New Standards, 13 J.W. TR. L. 108 (1979).
13o See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281 (S-VI) U.N Doc A/9559; Declaration of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc.
A19556 (1974).
131 Agreement for the Promotion of Investments, Egypt-Gr. Brit., supra note 110, art. 5.
132 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Singapore-Gr. Brit., supra
note 71, art. 5.
133 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Philippines-United King-
dom, supra note 107, art. 5.
134 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 6.
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"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation.3 The BIT equates
just compensation to the market value, however, in the absence of a
determinable market value, the measure of just compensation is the
actual loss sustained on or immediately before the date of expropria-
tion. No interest payment is mentioned in connection with the pay-
ment of compensation. 36
Under the Sri Lanka-Switzerland BIT, nationalization should be
carried out only for a public purpose and should be accompanied by
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Compensation is mea-
sured by the value immediately before the expropriation became pub-
lic knowledge, which might be different from the actual date of
expropriation. Under this agreement, there is no reference to market
value, and payment is to include interest at a normal commercial rate
until the date of payment.137 The China-Sweden agreement 38 pro-
vides that the amount of compensation payable for expropriation is
the sum which will place the investor in the same financial position as
he would have been if the expropriation had not occurred. 39 The
agreement does not expressly require "prompt" payment but it does
require that payment be made "without unreasonable delay."4 The
amount paid however should be convertible and freely transferable.
The France-Zaire BIT provides that investments made under the
treaty can be expropriated only for a public purpose.' 4' The expropri-
ation, nationalization and direct or indirect dispossession itself may
not be discriminatory nor contrary to a specific undertaking. 42 Fair
compensation, which equals the value of the assets at the time of the
expropriation must be paid.143 Finally, prior to the transfer of owner-
ship, the parties must agree to both the amount and manner of pay-
ment. The BITs manifest the inconsistency that obtains between the
BITs that have been concluded between the different countries. The
OECD countries have not maintained consistency in their practice, as
each BIT was negotiated on its own merits dictated by the economic
135 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Swed., supra note 74, art. 3.




139 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Swed., supra note 74, art. 3,
para. 1.
140 Id.
141 Convention on the Protection of Investments, October 5, 1972, Fr.-Zaire, art. 3, 986
U.N.T.S. 243.
142 Id. art. 3.
143 Id.
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and political interests of the capital importing and capital exporting
state.'" Of the 335 BITs surveyed in the ICSID study, 309 make the
furtherance of public interest a condition precedent for embarking on
any measures of expropriation. 45 139 of these BITs require that the
measure should be non-discriminatory and not in breach of any spe-
cific commitment not to expropriate. 146 24 BITs fail to expressly stip-
ulate the furtherance of public interest as a condition for
expropriation, but merely provide that the measure should be non-
discriminatory and not inconsistent with a specific commitment not to
expropriate. 2 BITs make no express reference to any condition but
simply require the payment of compensation for expropriation. With
regard to compensation, 167 BITs adopt the Hull formula of "prompt,
adequate and effective." Another 47 BITs provide for "just," "full,"
"reasonable" or "fair and equitable" compensation. The rest of the
BITs refer to appropriate compensation. 147
In the final analysis, the issue is what is the international legal
standard on compensation for expropriated property? The dearth of
BITs and the disparity in the various legal positions they advance add
to the confusion that already exists and their legal utility in my view is
limited only to the contracting parties.
In the U.S., the Supreme Court in the Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino'48 referred to the "disagreement" among states as to the
relevant international law standards and applied the Act of State Doc-
trine to avoid ruling against Cuba. But the U.S Congress in the two
Hickenlooper amendments asserted that international law requires
"speedy compensation in convertible foreign exchange equivalent to
144 Germany's BIT with Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Oman, and Syria requires "com-
pensation equivalent to the investment expropriated." Sometimes the formula used is that
"compensation shall be calculated in accordance with the value of the investment concerned
immediately before the date on which the expropriation or nationalization was publicly an-
nounced." E.g. BIT with Israel, 8 W.G.B.T. 1161. There is no uniformity in French practice
either. The Hull formula of full, adequate and effective compensation is used in the treaty with
Liberia (1979). An alternative formula of just compensation is used in treaties with Paraguay
(1981), El Salvador (1979), Sudan (1980), Jordan (1979), Syria (1980), Romania (1980) and
Malta (1977).
145 Khalil, supra note 76.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 351. See also Deidra A. Cody, Note, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Egypt and Panama, 13 GA. J. INr'L & COMp. L. 491 (1983); Joseph E. Pattison, The U.S.-Egypt
Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Prototype for Future Negotiation, 16 CoRNELL Ir'L LJ. 305
(1983); Paul Dempsey, Foreign Investment Incentives in the Developing World: The Legislation of
Greece, Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand and the Republic of China, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 575,
586-94 (1979); Ilona Cheyne, Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements, 36 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 929 (1987).
148 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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the full value of the property taken."' 49 Other congressional enact-
ments have also affirmed the "prompt, adequate and effective
formula" as a requirement of international law. Whereas the legisla-
ture and the executive have maintained that position, the judiciary has
trodden this path with a lot of trepidation and circumspection and has
consistently refused to swallow hook hide and sinker the universality
of the Hull formula. 5 ' Several "traditional" decisions of international
tribunals recognize the existence of an international obligation to pay
compensation when alien property is taken by a state. However, con-
trary to what is usually asserted with gusto, these contain no reference
to the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard. The Chorzow Fac-
tory Case,151 which is the most quoted decision in this regard, refers
only to a duty to pay fair compensation. In the Norwegian Ship Own-
ers Claim,5 ' the tribunal held that "just compensation" should be de-
termined by "fair actual value at the time and place" in view of all
surrounding circumstances.53
The argument that the "prompt, adequate and effective formula"
is traditional international law finds little support in state practice or
authoritative treatises and monographs. For example, Judge Charles
De Visscher, a past president of the ICJ concluded that state practice
in cases of nationalization hardly ever permits more than partial com-
pensation calculated less by the extent of damage than by the capacity
and good will of the nationalizing state.154 Professor Hersch Lauter-
149 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(1)(C) (1988). The words quoted are in the first Hickenlooper
Amendment and are referred to in the second amendment. See Louis HENK N ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, CASES AmD MATERiALS 790-91 (1st ed. 1980); Nancy Goodman, U.S.-Poland Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 255 (1991); Eileen Denza & Shelagh Brooks,
Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience, 36 INTL & Comp. L.Q. 908 (1987);
Andre W.B. Newburg, U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement and Investment Protection Treaties, 11
N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 117 (1990); Ocran T. Modibo, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A
Comparative Study, 8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 401 (1987).
150 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
151 Factory at Chorzow (Merits), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 46 (Sept. 13).
152 Norwegian Shipowners' Claim (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R.I.A.A. 307, 340 (October 12, 1922).
153 For earlier cases, see JACKSON H. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRBmNALS (1926) (Supp. 1936). In all these decisions, one cannot find a single decision
expressing the "prompt, adequate and effective compensation formula." The tribunals in these
cases examined the particular circumstances and announced their decision on whether the com-
pensation was just, or fair or in accordance with the relevant agreements. Professor Wengler, a
renowned German international law scholar, concluded after a thorough examination of the
cases that there were no decisions of international tribunals to the effect that in the event of any
and every non discriminating expropriation, full compensation was required. See generally, WiL-
HELM WENGLER, VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1964).
154 CHARLES DE VIsscHER, THEORY AND REALrrY iN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 203
(P.E. Corbett trans., 3d ed. 1968).
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pacht states an important qualification to the duty to compensate "in
cases in which fundamental changes in the political system and eco-
nomic structure of the state or far-reaching reforms entail interfer-
ence, on a large scale, with private property."'155 In such cases,
Professor Lauterpacht concluded that a solution must be found in the
grant of "partial compensation." Similar views were reflected in the
resolution and discussions of the Institut de droit international in 1950
as well as in the detailed studies of Western European jurists. 5 6 A
host of American international law jurists with time came to share the
views of the rest of the world on the non-universality of the "full, ade-
quate and prompt" compensation rule.15 7 In his lucid assessment of
the debate, the late Professor Wolfgang Friedman observed that:
It is nothing short of absurd to pretend that the protestation of the rule
of full, prompt and adequate compensation... in all circumstances is
representative of contemporary international law.' 58
It has been contended that the Hull formula which has been rejected
by a great many states in international fora has become largely polit-
ical rhetoric perceived as being symbolic in the confrontation between
the north and the south.15 9
Attempts to entrench the Hull standard through BITs do not cir-
cumvent the fact that the BITs do not evidence customary interna-
155 OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 352-54.
156 See 43 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1950); Bindschedler, La
Protection de la Proprit6 Privse en Droit International Public, 90 REcUEIL DES CouRs 173
(1956); Isi FoIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION: A STUDY IN THE PROTECTION OF ALIEN PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-26 (1957); S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1953); F.V. Garcia Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility to the International
Law Commission, [1959] reprinted in [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/Ser.A/
1959/Add.I.
157 Hans W. Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts: A Reply, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 801 (1960); Frank G. Dawson & Bums H. Weston, Promp4 Adequate and Effec-
tive.A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 1125,1128 (1948); RICHARD
B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP-SuM
AGREEMENTS 207-56 (1975); SEYMOUR J. RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTENT. LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC REAL=rEs 11-23 (1966); BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST-WAR
FR.Nc PRAncCE (1971).
158 Wolfgang Friedman, National Courts and the International Legal Order: Projections on the
Implications of the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443, 454 (1966).
159 RUBIN, supra note 157, at 23-28. See also Bums H. Weston, The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437,
455 (1981); Tom J. Farer, The U.S. and the Third WorltL" A Basis for Accommodation, 54 FOR-
EIGN An'. 79, 84 (1975); Oscar Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17-19 (1976); Maarten H. Muller, Compensation for Nationaliza-
tion: A North-South Dialogue, 19 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35 (1981); David A. Gantz, The
Marcona SettlemenL New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1977); William D. Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics and Lawyers: Some
Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978).
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tional law. To insist that they do, the proponents of such a theory
would have to proof that apart from the treaty itself, the rules in the
clauses are considered obligatory. It is interesting to note that extra-
dition and air transit treaties are examples of BITs with standard
clauses that are widely used yet nobody claims that those provisions
are declaratory of or constitutive of customary law binding on third
states."6 Oscar Schachter contends that if any inference of opinio
juris is to be made from the bilateral investment treaties, it would be
limited to the highly general-though not insignificant-finding that such
agreements are further evidence of the generally accepted rule that
compensation should be paid when the property is expropriated.' 6'
I contend that the acceptable standard is that of "appropriate
compensation" as this did not only receive unanimous United Nations
General Assembly support,162 but it has also been confirmed by
landmark arbitral awards and municipal court decisions of our time.
In Texaco v. Libya,63 the arbitrator, Jean-Ren6 Dupuy declared that
the requirement of "appropriate compensation" was the "opinio juris
communis" that reflected "the state of customary law existing in the
field." In support of this conclusion, Dupuy cited the acceptance of
this standard in Resolution 1803 which received support from both the
developed and the developing countries. He however did not mention
that the U.S representative while voting for the resolution explained
his vote for the resolution by stating that he was "confident that it
would be interpreted as meaning prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation."'" That very point was controversial in the UN committee
debates and a U.S proposal to include its interpretation was with-
drawn. 165 In the Banco Nacional Case,66 the court of appeals re-
viewed much of the literature on the subject and concluded that
160 Richard Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CouRs 25, 83-84 (1970).
161 Oscar Schacter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1986).
162 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
163 International Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in the Dispute Between Texaco
Overseas Petroleum/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 17 I.L.M. 329 (1978), 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
164 Stephen Schwebel, The Story of the U.N's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, 49 A.B.AJ. 463-66 (1963); F.A. MANN, FuRTHER STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1990); RIcHARD LILuCH, VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY UNDER U.S
AND OTHER BiTs (1987). See generally PERROT & POGANY, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREA-
aEs: CURRENT IssUES IN INTERNATIONAL BUsiNEsS LAW 155 (1988).
165 The legislative history of Resolution 1803 shows that the compromise reached in the UN
committee deliberately avoided endorsing either the U.S. interpretation or the contrary Latin
American position in favor of "national treatment" See Orrego Vicuna, Some International Law
Problems Posed by Nationalization of the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 721-
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It may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need not
be paid in all circumstances... and that requiring an expropriating state
to pay appropriate compensation.., even considering the lack of precise
definition of that term... would come close to reflecting what interna-
tional law requires.167
The court went on to add that
... the adoption of an appropriate compensation requirement would not
exclude the possibility that in some cases full compensation would be
appropriate.1 -r
In the Aminoil Award,169 the tribunal stated that the standard of "ap-
propriate compensation" as set forth in resolution 1803 codifies posi-
tive principles. 7 ° The tribunal declared that the determination of the
amount of an award of "appropriate compensation is better carried
out by means of an enquiry into all the circumstances relevant to a
particular concrete case, than through the abstract theoretical discus-
sion.' 171 The one general notion that the tribunal emphasized was
that of "legitimate expectations," a concept which was invoked by the
parties. With regard to this concept, the tribunal stated that there
must necessarily be economic calculations, and the weighing of rights
and obligations, of chances and risks, constituting the contractual
equilibrium."' 72 Judge Jimenez De Arrchaga, former President of the
ICJ, has favored "appropriate" because in his view, it conveys better
[than "just" or "adequate"] the complex circumstances which may be
present in each case and further, it brings in the concept of unjust
enrichment."'"
IX. APPLICABLE LAW AND THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DIsPUTES
Provisions in BITs relating to the resolution of investment dis-
putes are critical in the overall process of trying to secure a bilateral
23 (1973); C. Greenwood, State Contracts in International Law-The Libyan Oil Nationalizations,
53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 27 (1982).
166 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d at 892, paras. 14-15.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 American Independent Oil Company(Aminoil) v. Kuwait, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
170 Id. at 1032.
171 Id. at 1033-37.
172 American Independent Oil Company(Aminoil) v. Kuwait, 21 I.L.M. at 1037.
173 Jimenez de Arrchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 302 (1978). See also Richard Falk, The New States and International Legal Order, 118
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 29 (1966); F.A. Mann, Compound Interest as an Item of Damage in




regime of law that guarantees investors access to domestic courts and/
or international tribunals. 174
There is no uniformity on this point in the provisions of the vari-
ous BITs. Under the Egypt-U.K. BIT,175 each party consents in ad-
vance to the submission of legal disputes to conciliation or arbitration
under the ICSID convention, which gives direct access to individuals,
whether natural or legal persons, in their claims against a State.176 In
the event of a dispute, the State and the company concerned may re-
solve the conflict through pursuit of local remedies. If no agreement
is reached within three months, the complainant company may then
consent in writing to submit itself to the jurisdiction of ICSID, after
which either party may institute the appropriate proceedings in the
manner provided for under the convention. 77 If there is disagree-
ment as to whether conciliation or arbitration is the more appropriate
procedure, the affected company chooses the most desirable alterna-
tive. The agreement also contains a specific provision on disputes re-
lating to payment of compensation in the event of nationalization. In
particular, the agreement provides for the application of two systems
of law: (i) domestic law (ii) international law (being typified by the
BIT). The agreement also contains the principle of subrogation which
enables the indemnifying State to assert any right or claim which the
indemnified company as its predecessor in title could have so asserted
against the other contracting state.178 The provisions of the Singa-
pore-U.K. BIT179 regarding the applicable law and the settlement of
investment disputes are substantially the same as those in Egypt-U.K.
BIT, save for three exceptions: (i) the U.K.-Singapore BIT stipulates
that ICSID arbitration is the only acceptable dispute resolution mech-
anism; (ii) the agreement contains an additional clause barring a party
to a dispute from raising as an objection the fact that the national or
company concerned has received an indemnity for some or all of its
174 Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT- The Growth ofBITS and their Impact on Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655 (1990); Salacuse, Towards a New Treaty
Framework for Direct Foreign Investment, 50 J. AIR L. & Comm. 969 (1985).
175 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Egypt, supra note 110.
176 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Egypt, supra note 110,
at art. 8, par 1.
177 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Egypt, supra note 110.
178 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Egypt, supra note 110,
at art. 10.
179 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K and N. Ir.-Sing., supra
note 71, art. 8.
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losses in pursuance of an investment insurance contract;180 (iii) the
agreement also provides that a state's right to subrogation is expanded
to include the right to be accorded treatment not less favorable than
that accorded to the funds of nationals of the other contracting State
or of third States.'8 ' Moreover, such amounts or credits are to be
freely available to the indemnified State to meet its expenditures in
the territory of the investee State.182 The total effect of the foregoing
provisions is to make the position of the investor stronger under the
Singapore-U.K agreement than the Egypt-U.K agreement. Under the
Philippines-U.K. agreement, the parties to a dispute may select either
arbitration or conciliation in accordance with ICSID rules.183 Unlike
the BIT with Egypt and Singapore, no prior submission by the State to
ICSID is required in this case. However, if in the event of a dispute
the aggrieved company submits to ICSID jurisdiction and then re-
quests the State to do the same, the State then becomes obliged to
accept ICSID jurisdiction."8
Under the Sri Lanka-Switzerland agreement, the starting point of
dispute settlement is the exhaustion of local remedies. If the conflict
cannot be resolved within twelve months, either party can transfer it
to ICSID for settlement."8 There has to be a mutual agreement to
submit to ICSID since there is no compulsory jurisdiction. Thereafter,
if there is disagreement as to whether conciliation or arbitration
should be adopted, the agreement follows the Egypt-U.K. agreement
and allows the affected party to make the decision.'8 6 The agreement
also provides that a company incorporated in the host State maintains
its access to ICSID procedures, provided that it is controlled by na-
tionals or companies of the other contracting parties.187 Like the Sin-
gapore-U.K agreement, the Sri-Lanka-Switzerland agreement renders
inadmissible any objection to enforcement of an award on the grounds
that indemnity has already been paid to the company. There is also a
180 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-U.K., supra note 110,
art. 8, para. 1.
181 Id. art. 10.
182 Id.
183 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-PhiI., art. X(2), supra
note 107, art. X(1).
184 Id. This in a veiled sense amounts to compulsory ICSID jurisdiction for Egypt, U.K and
Singapore that attaches at the behest of the foreign private investor.
185 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 9.
186 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 9, para 2.
187 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 9, para 2.
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provision that precludes diplomatic intervention of the host State of
the foreign private investor in the resolution of disputes that have
been submitted to ICSID. 188 The indemnifying State also has a right
of subrogation regarding any claims to which the company is enti-
tled. 8 9 The repatriation of funds arising from subrogation is to be
accorded most favored nation treatment.'19 On the applicable law,
the agreement provides that the law of the host state is the law that is
expected to govern all investments in its territory.191 This general rule
is however made subject to other provisions of the agreement and to
rules of international law. For example, the provision on expropria-
tion subjects the determination of the amount of compensation paya-
ble, and the valuation of investments, to the rules laid down in that
agreement.'92
Under the China-Sweden BIT,' 93 dispute settlement procedures
must be fair and equitable. It follows by implication that parties to a
dispute are to be accorded the same facilities as those given to inves-
tors from third states. It is expressly provided that the agreement is
not intended to take away or diminish any rights or benefits accruing
to companies under international law.194 The BIT thus implies that
such companies have access to national courts and that national law is
the applicable law in dispute settlement. The BIT however contains
no direct reference to any international procedures to which investors
have access. In contrast, the France-Tunisia BIT of 1972 requires that
the parties enter into a specific undertaking and that such undertaking
shall cover, inter alia, recourse to ICSID in the event that an amicable
settlement has not been reached within three months. 95 The France-
Egypt Investment Guarantee Agreement' 96 and the France and for-
mer Yugoslavia BIT also require the contracting parties to enter into a
188 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 9, para 3.
189 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 10.
190 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 10.
191 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art. 4.
192 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sri Lanka-
Switz., supra note 118, art 6.
193 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Swed., supra note 74.
194 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Swed., supra note 74, art. 7.
195 Convention on the Protection of Investments, June 30,1972, Fr.-Tunis., art. I, 848 U.N.T.S.
144.
196 Convention Concerning the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Ex-
changes of Letters), Dec. 22, 1974, Fr.-Egypt, art. 8, 996 U.N.T.S. 381, 384.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:327 (1994)
specific agreement providing recourse to ICSID.19 Of the 335 BITs
studied by ICSID, almost all make reference to an arbitration clause.
Two hundred twelve BITs require arbitration under ICSID proce-
dures, either as the only, or as an alternative, way for the settlement of
investment disputes.19 s
The recent BIT between Argentina and the United States is his-
toric on account of its provisions on issues that have divided these two
countries for centuries.199 An accompanying report to the President
on the treaty from Arnold Kanter, Acting Secretary of State, dated 13
January, 1993 stated that
The BIT with Argentina represents an important milestone in the BIT
program... Argentina, like many Latin American countries, has long
subscribed to the Calvo Doctrine, which requires that aliens submit dis-
putes arising in a country to that country's local courts. The conclusion
of this treaty, which contains an absolute right to international arbitra-
tion of investment disputes, removes U.S investors from the restrictions
of the Calvo Doctrine and should help pave the way for similar agree-
ments with other Latin American countries.' e
197 Convention on the Protection of Investments, Mar. 28, 1974, Fr.-Yugo., art. 1, 974
U.N.T.S. 107, 108.
198 Khalid, supra note 76. See also Van De Voorde, Belgian BITS as a Means for Promoting
and Protecting Foreign Investment, 44 STUDIA DIPLOMATiCA 87 (1991); PETER WoLFoANo, AR-
BITRATION AND RENEGOTIATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INvESTMENT AGREEMENTS 218-25
(1986); Gudgeon Scott, Arbitration Provisions in U.S. BITs, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DispuTs: AvOIDANCE OR SurEMENT 41 (Seymour Rubin & Richard Nelson eds., 1985).
199 Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14,
1991, U.S.-Arg., S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 111 (1993); reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
124 (1992).
200 The legal environment in Latin America dealing with foreign direct investment has gone
through a dramatic change in the recent past. Today Chile for example exerts no control over
foreign investment. See Law No. 18, 447 November 30, 1985, amending decree Law No. 600,
March 18, 1977. For Uruguay See Law No. 808/974, Oct. 10, 1974 [97 second semester 1] REGIS-
TRO NACIONAL DR LEYES Y DECRETOS 988. For Paraguay, See Law No.550, Dee 1975 la Ley
126 (July-Sept. 1980). A flexible approach to foreign investment is also being taken in the An-
dean Common Market (ANCOM) region. ANCOM-consisting of Bolivia, Ecuador, Columbia,
Peru and Venezuela-had promulgated Decision 24, which established minimum restrictions that
its member states were required to impose upon foreign investments. See Decision 24, reprinted
in Andean Commission: Codified Text of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 16 I.L.M. 138
(1977). This decision prohibited contractual clauses recognizing subrogation of home govern-
ments to claims of foreign investors. In the mid 1980's, the ANCOM started chipping away at
Decision 24 and countries like Bolivia virtually suspended the divestment requirements. See M.
AGosiN & V. RIBEIRO, INVERsioNES Ex-RAjERAs DucEcrAS EN AMERICA LATINA:
TENDENCIAS RECIENTAS Y PERSPECrIVAS, INTEGRACION LATINO AMERICA 21 (June 1987). Bo-
livia, Colombia and Ecuador concluded bilateral agreements with OPIC. On May 11, 1987,
ANCOM approved Decision 220 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement on the Com-
mon Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trade Marks, Patents and Royalties to Re-
place Decision 24, May 11, 1987, reprinted and translated in 2 ICSID REv. FILJ 519 (1987).
Decision 220 restores to member states control over profit remittances, decisions as to which
sectors shall be reserved for national investors and determinations of which fora should be avail-
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Under this BIT, exhaustion of local remedies is not required. The
treaty identifies several different procedures for arbitration, at the in-
vestors option: The ICSID tribunal, upon Argentina's adherence to
the ICSID convention; the ICSID Additional Facility, if ICSID is not
available; or ad hoe arbitration under the arbitration rules of the UN
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).20'
From the foregoing, it is evident that most BITS refer to ICSID
arbitration while others refer to the optional facility of the ICSID or
to some ad hoc arbitration.2 2 It is important however to note that the
mere reference in the BIT that disputes arising from foreign invest-
ments protected by it should be submitted to ICSID arbitration does
not necessarily create jurisdiction under ICSID tribunal.' 3 Under IC-
SID, only the consent of the parties creates jurisdiction in the tribunal.
Whether an investment treaty can give prior consent to ICSID de-
pends on the words used in the treaty. Aron Broches makes a distinc-
tion between four types of clauses in BITS relating to arbitration:
(1) The dispute shall upon agreement by both parties, be submitted for
arbitration by the Centre.2 ' Such a clause requires a further specific
agreement referring any particular dispute to arbitration by the ICSID
tribunal.
(2) The second type, requiring "sympathetic consideration to a request
to conciliation or arbitration by the Centre," does not amount to con-
sent, but implies "an obligation not to withhold consent unreasonably.20 5
(3) The third type requires the host state to "assent to any demand on
the part of the national to submit for conciliation or arbitration "any
dispute arising from the investment., 206
The clause which is always found in U.K treaties reads
able for dispute resolution. Most of the Latin American countries have acceded to the U.N
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2417, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, Jan 30, 1975, OAS Treaty Ser. No. 42, reprinted in Inter-American Specialized Con-
ference on Private International Law: Six Inter-American Conventions, 14 I.L.M. 325, 336
(1975).
201 Text of the treaty and protocol attached thereto are reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992).
202 For ICSID history, see Joy CHERiAN, INVEsTMENT CONTRACrs AND ARBrRATION
(1975).
203 See Aron Broches, BITs and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF ARBmA-
TION, LIBER AMiCoRUM PmaR SANDERS 63 (Jan Schultz & Albert Van Den Berg eds., 1982).
204 See, e.g., The Sweden-Malaysia Treaty, Mar. 3, 1979, U.N.T.S. 1980.
205 E.g. Netherlands-Kenya Treaty, Sept.11, 1970, U.N.T.S 1978. The treaty does not resolve
the issue of what amounts to reasonableness or otherwise of the withholding of consent.
206 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment, July 7, 1968, Neth.-
Indon., 799 U.N.T.S 1322 (1971).
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Each contracting party hereby consents to submit to the Center any dis-
pute arising between that contracting State and a national company of
the other contracting party.2 7
Such a clause may create jurisdiction in ICSID, and Broches contends
that
Provisions of this kind (e.g the British type), subject to the conditions
stated therein and subject further to their compatibility with the conven-
tion, will enable the investor to institute proceedings against the host
State before the Center and may entitle the host State to avail itself of
the same remedy against the investor.
The foregoing examination of various BITs demonstrates that though
the settlement of investment disputes through arbitration is accepted
in BITs, the mere reference to it in the treaties should not be made
the basis of an assessment that arbitration has come to be accepted as
the method of settling investment disputes or that there is an obliga-
tion to refer such disputes to international arbitration so that they may
be settled in accordance with a supranational body of legal principles
or what is now commonly known as lex mercantoria.0 The diversity
of the clauses does not admit the making of such claims. However, it
is plausible to claim that on the basis of these treaties, the trend is
towards the acceptance of international arbitration, particularly arbi-
tration by ICSID of foreign investment disputes.20 9
An understanding of how ICSID works is relevant to the deter-
mination of applicable law in foreign investment disputes. ICSID was
created by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes210 to provide a forum for conflict resolution in a framework
which carefully balances the interests and requirements of all parties
involved. It also attempts to depoliticize the settlement of investment
disputes.21' The ICSID convention gives investors direct access to an
207 E.g. Gr. Brit.-Bangladesh Treaty, supra note 71.
208 F.A. Mann contends that the treaty clause will not protect an investor unless he includes a
corresponding clause in his contract with the State. See F. A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN IN.
TERNATIONAL LAW 248 (1992).
209 Here, the BIT serves to open the door while the individual contract between the private
investor and the host State gets the investor through the door to the most coveted world of
international arbitration that was heretofore closed to individuals-not being subjects of interna-
tional law.
210 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, March 18,1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention],
reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965).
211 See Executive Directors Report, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965); Aron Broches, The Ex-
perience of ICSID: Avoidance and Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL AND INVESTMENT DIsPUrES:
AVOIDANCE AND Sm rmENrTr 75, 77 (S. Rubin & R. Nelson eds., 1985); David Soley, ICSID
Implementation: An Effective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 Irr'L L. 521 (1985). IC-
SID's Administrative Council which acts as its governing body reflects the balance of interests of
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international forum and that assures them that the refusal or absten-
tion of the state party to a dispute to participate in the proceedings
after it has given its consent cannot frustrate the arbitral process. But
the ICSID convention212 also provides that a contracting state may, as
a condition of its consent to ICSID arbitration, require prior exhaus-
tion of local remedies. This condition may be specified in various
ways. It could, for instance, be stipulated in the investment agreement
as was usually the case in agreements concluded with Latin American
countries.
The model clauses prepared by the ICSID secretariat to assist in-
vestors and states in drafting ICSID arbitration clauses, acknowledge
this option by suggesting the following language for possible insertion
in an ICSID clause:
Before [name of investor] institutes an arbitration proceeding in accord-
ance with the provisions of this agreement, [name of investor] must ex-
haust [all local remedies] [the (following) (administrative) judicial
remedies] [, unless (name of host state) waives that requirement inwriting]. .213
Another way of accomplishing the same objective can result from the
declaration made by a contracting State at the time of signature or
ratification of the ICSID convention that it intends to avail itself of
the provisions of Article 26 and will require, as a condition of its con-
sent to ICSID arbitration, the exhaustion of its local remedies. Of the
91 signatory States, only Israel has made such a declaration.
Under Article 42 of the ICSID convention, an arbitral tribunal
must decide a dispute in accordance with the rules of law agreed by
the parties. Most ICSID clauses in BITs communicated to ICSID sec-
retariat provide for host state's law.214 In the absence of a specific
agreement on this matter, the ICSID convention Article 42(1) explic-
the developed and developing countries. The Council consists of one representative of each
contracting State, the total number of which is at present eighty eight. Each representative casts
one vote. The ICSID convention therefore ensures equal representation to all contracting states.
The Administrative Council approves the regulations and rules governing the proceedings relat-
ing to investment disputes and elects the Secretary General of the ICSID. Over and above its
duty as a dispute resolution forum, ICSID's paramount responsibility is to promote a climate of
mutual confidence between investors and States favorable to increasing the flow of resources to
developing countries under reasonable conditions. It is essentially an instrument of international
policy for the promotion of investments and of economic development.
212 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 210, art. 26.
213 For ICSID model clauses, see Article 47 of ICSID Convention and Rule 39(5) of the
Arbitration Rules.
214 GEORGES R. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS ch. XV, para. 15.24 (1982).
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itly stipulates that the law of the host state would apply, along with
such rules of international law as may be applicable.
The balance of interests that ICSID has advocated has held as-
cendancy in a number of leading arbitral awards in which the issue of
applicable law to the dispute has been contested. In Kuwait v. Ami-
noil,215 the parties had agreed in an arbitration agreement to the fol-
lowing applicable law clause:
The law governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be
determined by the tribunal, having regard to the quality of the parties,
the transactional character of their relations and the principles of law
and practice prevailing in the modern world.' 6
As to the law applicable to the substantive issues in the dispute, the
arbitrators declared that "the law of Kuwait applies to any matters
over which it is the law most directly involved." They went on to note
however that "established public international law is necessarily a part
of the law of Kuwait... In their turn, the general principles of law are
part of public international law..." The arbitrators thus applied both
Kuwait and public international law, Kuwait law being the law most
directly involved and public international law being a part of Kuwait
law.
In Texaco v. Libya,21 7 the sole arbitrator had to decide to which
legal system to refer to determine whether and to what extent the
concession agreement was binding on the parties. Although the un-
derlying concession agreement contained an express choice of law
clause providing that the concession was to be "governed by and inter-
preted in accordance with the general principles of law, including such
of those principles as may have been applied by international tribu-
nals...,"2 18 there had been no agreement on the law to be applied in
determining the issue of the concession agreement's validity. In de-
ciding this question, the sole arbitrator chose international law over
the municipal law of Libya.219 There had likewise been no explicit
agreement on what law should govern procedural matters. In decid-
ing this question, the arbitrator considered whether municipal law or
international law should govern and decided in favor of international
law. 0 On the question of applicable substantive law, the arbitrator
215 Kuwait v. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. 976, 980 (1982).
216 Kuwait v. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. at 1000.
217 Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 3 (1978).
218 Id. at 14.
219 Id. at 11-12.




also referred to international law as empowering the parties to choose
the two-tier system.221 The arbitrator held that
[t]his tribunal.., holds that it is established that the deeds of concession
in dispute are within the domain of public international law and that this
law empowered the parties to choose the law which was to govern their
contractual relations.'
In Libyan American Oil v. Libya,22 the sole arbitrator found interna-
tional law applicable to the question of validity of the governing law
and arbitration clauses.224 With regard to the procedural law, the ar-
bitrator rejected the law of the seat in favor of the rules set forth in
the U.N Convention on Arbitral Procedure.225 On the applicable sub-
stantive law question, the arbitrator looked to "both municipal and
international law, as prescribed by the proper law of the contract.226
In the S.P.P (Middle East), Ltd. and Southern Pacific Properties,
Ltd. v. Egypt & Egyptian General Co. for Tourism and Hotels arbitra-
tion,227 which involved a claim for a breach of contracts with Egypt for
the development of a tourism facility on the plateau adjacent to the
pyramids at Giza, the parties had not agreed to an applicable law
clause. The tribunal held that in the absence of an agreement of the
parties, general principles of international law were a part of the law
of Egypt and "that the national laws of Egypt can be relied upon only
in as much as they do not contravene the said principles."'  The tri-
bunal thus applied the law of Egypt as well as applicable rules of inter-
national law to the substantive issue of Egypt's liability referring to
Article 42(1) of the ICSID convention as "illustrative of a principle of
wider application."22 9 Under Egyptian and international law, the tri-
221 Id. at 14.
222 Id.
223 Arbitral Tribunal: Award in Dispute Between Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco)
and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic Relating to Petroleum Concessions, 20 I.L.M.
12 (1981).
224 Id. at 32-34.
225 Id. at 42.
226 Id. at 85. In BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979)(award on the
merits, Aug. 1, 1974), the law of the seat of the arbitration was held applicable. On the applica-
ble substantive law question, the arbitrator looked to the general principles of law. Id. at 329.
227 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration: Award in the Arbitration between
S.P.P. (Middle East) Limited Southern Pacific Properties Limited and the Arab Republic of
Egypt, the Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels, 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983) (award on
merits, March 11, 1983) (Bernini, Elghatit, Lattman, arb., Elghatit dissenting and refusing to sign
the award).
228 Id. at 771.
229 Id. at 769.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:327 (1994)
bunal found that the principles of pacta sunt servanda and just com-
pensation for expropriatory measures applied.230
X. CONCLUSION
Whereas a lot of ink has been poured by scholars of different
persuasions arguing with passion that the proliferation of BITs has
had the effect of entrenching the traditional principles of public inter-
national law in the area of state responsibility for property belonging
to aliens, a close analysis of the various BITs in this paper has re-
vealed that there is not sufficient consistency in the terms of the in-
vestment treaties to find in them support for any definite principle of
customary international law. To borrow the logic of the words of the
ICJ in the Asylum Case,23' the foregoing analysis of BITs has mani-
fested "so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation
and discrepancy in the rapid conclusion of BITs, and the practice has
been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in
the various cases, that it is not easy to discern in all the treaties any
constant and uniform usage, accepted as law regulating foreign
investment."
The BITs, then, merely amount to devices to boost investor confi-
dence. Their legal significance is that by providing for arbitration and
for subrogation, they ensure that the investors have certain remedies
which but for the BIT would have been unavailable to them. The
OECD countries have sought to protect their investors through bilat-
eral agreements on account of the morass of confusion that presently
obtains in international multilateral forums which was occasioned by
the espousal of new norms by the developing countries, norms that
are diametrically opposed to the traditional rules of state responsibil-
ity for foreign investment. The main objective of the treaties is to
create a separate legal regime of investment protection quite apart
from the "customary" international law on foreign investment protec-
tion which though not fully agreed upon, it is also not sufficiently de-
veloped to afford protection to the new forms of foreign investment.
Faced with the need for certitude in the legal regime of foreign invest-
ment protection more suited to modern conditions, states have seen in
230 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration: Award in the Arbitration between
S.P.P. (Middle East) Limited Southern Pacific Properties Limited and the Arab Republic of
Egypt, the Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels, supra note 227, at 770. The
award was annulled in French courts but only because of the absence of consent by Egypt to the
arbitration clause. See Arab Republic of Egypt vs. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East),
232 I.L.M. 1048 (1984)(Cour d'appel, Paris, July 12, 1984).
231 Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. Rep. 266, at 277.
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the making of BITs an acceptable way of achieving this objective.3 2
This view is supported by an analysis of modern trends in foreign in-
vestment protection made by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction
Case,3 3 where the court observed that
[c]onsidering the important developments of the last half century, the
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of international activi-
ties of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often
multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests
of states have proliferated, it may at first appear surprising that the
evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted
rules in the matter have crystallized on the international plane.
No definite universally accepted and consistently applied rules have
crystallized in the intervening period since the Barcelona Case. Ef-
forts at formulating codes on regulation of foreign investment and
multinational corporations have not met with great success either.3 4
In effect, each BIT reflects the promotion and protection of each
country's interest and the principles of law that are distilled into each
treaty are essentially a by-product of an exchange of quid pro quo
between the negotiating parties. This scenario accounts for the vari-
ance in the treaty practice of each state. The BIT creates legal obliga-
tions between the parties and confers greater protection to investors
than is provided by the confused norms of international investment
law. Effectively, the BITs have contributed not to the creation of uni-
versal customary international law as such, but to the creation of spe-
232 Attempts at creating a multilateral system at Havana failed miserably at a time when
developing countries were a minority in the international arena. See Art. 11 of the Havana
Charter (not in force) March 24, 1948.
233 Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I.CJ. Rep. 3.
234 OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPOATIONS (1976);
OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS. REVIEw OF THE
1976 DECLARATION AND DECISIONS (1979). The Guidelines are nonbinding and absolutely vol-
untary in nature. By virtue of the code, the OECD members agreed to progressively abolish
among one another restrictions on the movement of capital to the extent necessary for effective
economic co-operation. Another example of a regional multilateral treaty is the agreement on
the investment and movement of capital among Arab States, a multilateral convention con-
cluded in 1970 among members of the league. It has however been subject to the political visic-
citudes of the Arab world and never took off the ground. See Jeswald Salacuse, Arab Capital
and Trilateral Ventures in the Middle East" Is Three a Crowd?, in RIcH AND POOR STATES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 129, 146-47 (Malcolm E. Kerr & Elsayal Yassine eds., 1982). The United
Nations under the auspices of the United Nations Center For Transnational Corporations
(UNCC) has continued to make efforts that are intended to lead to the adoption of a code of
conduct for MNCs in such areas as competition, taxation, transfer of technology, employment
relations, information disclosure etc. Draft text reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 602 (1984). See Seymour
Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relation-
ship Between International Legal Co-operation and Economic Development, 30 AM. U.L. REV.
903 (1981). Thus far, the effort to secure a binding code of conduct has been no more successful
than has the effort to secure a multilateral treaty to facilitate the free movement of capital.
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cial custom between contracting parties.3 5 In the Right of Passage
Case between India and Portugal, the ICJ noted that
it is contended on behalf of India that no local custom could be estab-
lished between only two States. It is difficult to see why the number of
States between which a local custom may be established on the basis of
long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The court sees no
reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by
them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual
rights and obligations between the two States.236
This case may contain the most decisive recognition of particular cus-
tomary rules as opposed to general customary rules.37 The court
noted that the situation was "a concrete case having special features;
that the practice between the two States was clearly established and
that therefore such a particular practice must prevail over any general
rules.3 s To the extent that States in their various BITS agree to con-
form to particular standards of treatment of the investment of nation-
als of each other, that ipso de jure becomes the law between the two
sovereign nations. It is immaterial that a State may have BITs that
provide for different treatment with any of its other contracting par-
ties. The regime of law established between two sovereign nations in
each BIT suffices to establish the special custom if they faithfully fol-
low the dictates of their BIT to the letter.
It is important to note that there are some principles that are
common to almost all the BITs and thus by and large evince the prac-
tice of States. Effectively, there is utility to the BITs in this regard in
formulating legal principles that may become customary international
law. Whereas there may not be agreement on some of these princi-
ples at the international level, the BITs contribute incrementally to
the crystallization of customary international law which ultimately
may be distilled into treaty law.
In conclusion, I contend that bilateral negotiations that lead to
the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties will not settle disposi-
tively the issues of public international law regarding investment law
235 The distinction between general custom and special custom is very simple. General cus-
tomary law applies to all States, while special custom concerns relations between a smaller set of
States. As Professor Myres McDougal has put it:
Some prescriptions are inclusive of the globe; other prescriptions recognize self direction by
smaller units.
MYREs McDoUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 15 (1960). See also OLIvER J. Lissi-
TYZN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND ToMoRRow 7 (1965); Salt, The Local Ambit of Cus-
tom, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 279, 283 (1926).
236 Right of Passage Case (India v. Port.), 1960 I.CJ Rep. 4, 39.
237 KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2nd rev. ed. 1993).
238 Right of Passage Case, 1960 I.CJ Rep. at 44.
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that is necessary to ensure unfettered mobility of capital across fron-
tiers. There is a need for an international multilateral conference to
negotiate an international regime of investment law.239 This duty to
produce a multilateral legal blueprint should not be abdicated at the
expense of the easier path of bilateral negotiations where the ex-
change of quids between the developed and some vulnerable third
world countries holds sway. The time has come and now is when such
a conference is absolutely feasible. The world must rise to the occa-
sion and seize the opportunity or forever miss the boat.
239 The World Bank-IMF Joint Development Committee attempted to deliver a legal frame-
work for the treatment of foreign direct investment. See ICSID Rev.-FILJ Vol. 7 No. 2, Fall
1992. The guidelines cover each of the four main areas usually dealt with in investment treaties,
namely the admission, treatment and expropriations of foreign investments and the settlement of
disputes between governments and foreign investors. In the communique issued by the develop-
ment committee after discussing the guidelines, it noted that the guidelines constituted a further
step in the evolutionary process where several international efforts aim to establish a favorable
investment environment free from non-commercial risks in all countries, and thereby foster the
confidence of international investors. Accordingly, the committee called the attention of mem-
ber countries to the guidelines as useful parameters in the admission and treatment of private
foreign investment in their territories, without prejudice to the binding rules of international law
at this stage of its development.
It is important to note that the guidelines are not legally binding even though they may
represent the opinio juris on the issues at hand. The guidelines are also not exhaustive as they
only deal with the obligations of the host state and do not mention the obligations of the foreign
investor to the host state which is by all means a fatal omission that casts great doubt on the
juridical utility of the guidelines. The fear of reproducing the work of the UNCC is under-
standable. This omission underscores the need for a multilateral conference to settle the regime
of international law governing foreign direct investment hopefully once and for all.
